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and Klaus.Fischer@fas.ulaval.caRésumé : Cet article étudie la relation qui existe entre la structure de propriété et de
gouvernance des institutions de dépôt (ID) d’un côté, et la cause dominante de faillite
de l’autre. Une abondante littérature démontre que les ID détenues par actions, au
sein desquelles les dirigeants sont bien supervisés (soit par le marché ou le Conseil
d’Administration) ou ont des intérêts alignés à ceux des actionnaires, font faillite en
raison du risque moral entre actionnaires et détenteurs de la dette, manifesté dans
les états financiers ou hors bilan. Par ailleurs, au sein de ID dont le contrôle est
diffus, caractérisées par un faible contrôle des dirigeants ou des intérêts divergents
des actionnaires et de la direction, la cause principale de faillite  réside plutôt dans la
manifestation de coûts d’agence ou préférence pour la dépense qui conduit à la
faillite. Nous exploitons l’opportunité qu’offre la crise Colombienne du secteur
bancaire et des coopératives financières (CF) et la qualité relative de l’information
disponible de ce pays pour réaliser l’étude. Notre objectif est d’établir empiriquement
l’importance relative de ces deux conflits comme déterminants de faillite de l’ID. Les
résultats suggèrent que, dans le cas de la Colombie, le risque moral est un facteur
clé dans la faillite des banques alors que les coûts d’agence expliquent la faillite des
CF. La faillite des banques étatiques s’explique de manière significative et
simultanée par le risque moral et les coûts d’agence.
Abstract : In this paper we study the relationship that exists between ownership and
governance structure of depository institutions (DI) on one side, and the dominant
cause of failure on the other. Extant theory implies that while in stock owned DI
where management is either well controled (through markets or board control) or
interests are aligned with those of shareholders, the dominant cause of failure will be
moral hazard between shareholders and debtholders, manifested in balance sheet or
off-balance sheet risk taking. On the other hand, in DI of diffuse ownership with poor
management control or where management’s interests are not alligned with those of
owners, the dominant cause of failure will be agency costs, manifested in expense
preference behavior that leads of failure. We exploit the opportunity that offers the
Colombian crisis of banks and financial cooperatives (FC) and the relatively good
quality of data available for this country to perform the study. Our objective is to
establish empirically the relative importance of these two conflicts as determinants of
insolvency in DI. Results suggest that, in the case of Colombia, moral hazard is a key
factor in explaining bank failure while agency costs explain insolvencies among FC.
In state-owned banks both moral hazard and agency costs are significant in
explaining failure. We also control whether the absence « quality of management »
provides a better explanation of failure than agency costs, but reject this hypothesis.Corporate governance and depository institutions failure: the case of
an emerging market economy
And when I mind with how much greediness
We seek the present gain in everything
Not caring (so our lust we may possess)
What damage to posteriority we bring
”A Collection of Emblems”. George Wither
1 Introduction
In this paper we test the hypothesis that corporate governance determines the extent to which
agency costs and moral hazard play a role in failure of depository institutions (DI).1 More specif-
ically, we test whether DI whose governance is weak due to di¤use ownership, such as mutual
intermediaries, are more likely to fail due to severe agency costs, while institutions with strong
governance due to concentrated ownership, such as stock banks, are more exposed to moral hazard
resulting from con‡icts of interest between shareholders and debtholders. 2 Although this hypoth-
esis has not to our knowledge been tested directly, it is implicit in the extant theory of …nancial
intermediation. This theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, in DI with concentrated ownership and
strong governance, moral hazard will be the con‡ict that dominates as cause of failure when it oc-
curs, while agency costs will dominate as a cause of failure in DI with di¤use ownership and weaker
governance. However, other mechanisms to control these con‡icts such as markets and hierarchies
will also in‡uence the outcome. To test this hypothesis, we evaluate the relative importance of
both con‡icts in explaining failure of DI with di¤erent ownership and governance structures in an
emerging market: Colombia. In doing this, we contribute to the litterature that seeks to explain
…nancial institutions failure and a regulatory and supervisory framework that may create more
stable conditions in the …nancial sector.
Our tests support the hypothesis that in DI with di¤use ownership, suchas …nancial cooperaives
and cooperaive banks, agency costs dominate as cause of failure. Moral hazard dominates in com-
mercial banks of concentrated ownership. In state owned banks, both factors appear to play a
nearly equal role as determinant of failure.
The link between moral hazard and stock bank insolvency has been substantiated both at the
theoretical and empirical level for industrialized and developing countries. But, is this also the
main reason why DI with di¤erent corporate governance or ownership such as …nancial coopera-
tives (FC) and state-owned banks fail? To respond to this question we confront in a direct way
1For the purpose of this paper we will use the expressions ”agency costs” and ”moral hazard” in a somewhat loose
fashion to refer to the two con‡icts of interest that exist between owners of the …rm vs. managers, and depositors
vs. shareholders respectively. These two di¤erent labels are consistent with the use given to these two terms in the
literature and allow us to distinguish the two con‡icts throughout the text. Strictly speaking, both con‡icts can
be described by asymmetric information models labeled as moral hazard with hidden information (Rasmusen, [85]).
The di¤erence between the two resides only in the parties that act as principals and agents.
2La Porta et al [60] di¤erentiate six ownership categories: widely held (with no signi…cant shareholder) family
or individually owned, state owned, institutionally owned, corporate owned or cooperatively owned. We focus here
on DI falling under the second (family or individually owned), third (state owned) and last (cooperatively owned)
categories.
1those factors that play a dominant role in insolvencies for stock banks in hands of private individ-
uals, state owned banks and cooperative DI (FC and cooperative banks). Theory suggests that,
depending on ownership di¤usion and corporate governance, either moral hazard or agency costs
can lead to sub-optimal decision-making in the DI. However, banking failure literature has focused
almost exclusively on moral hazard issues as determinant of insolvency, because shareholders at-
tempt to expropriate either liability holders or the deposit insurance fund. While in the public
banking corporation agency con‡icts are an issue, they are rarely seen as a determinant of failure
and largely ignored by supervisors. In fact, the contrary is considered to be true: administrators
are seen as conservative decision makers that seek to preserve their employment through low risk
investment decisions resulting in lower insolvency risk. However, a substantial body of literature
based on expense preference behavior (EPB) theory applied to …nancial intermediaries, suggests
that ownership di¤usion and EPB are positively correlated. Can this EPB be so extreme as to
a¤ect the very solvency of the …nancial intermediary?
The Colombian case, with relatively good quality of the data, a diversity in ownership and cor-
porate governance, and a relatively large sample size in terms of the number of failed DI, provide an
opportunity to study the fundamentals of this phenomenon in an emerging market. The Colombian
data available for both the banking (public and state owned) and FC systems o¤er the possibility
of contrasting in a direct way the factors that contribute most to the failure of DI as a function of
their ownership structure.
The question of the reasons behind failures of DI with di¤erent corporate governance and lev-
els of ownership di¤usion, although tested in this paper on Colombian data only, is of relevance
for regulators and supervisors in emerging markets in general. In these countries, regulators and
supervisors, in‡uenced by the traditional moral hazard literature, when performing prudential su-
pervision and system crisis prevention focus mostly on the various manifestations of this con‡ict.
Although this may indeed be the appropriate focus in the supervision of stock banks under control
of private individuals, it may be misleading when overseeing institutions with a di¤erent corporate
governance such as state-owned banks and mutual intermediaries. In other words, they may be
deceived by an apparent ”safe” management of the institution, missing the warning signals of an
incoming failure. This widening of the focus of prudential supervision is particularly important for
bankingauthorities that must expand their …eld ofaction to include state-owned banks, cooperative
banks and FC, a development that started in many countries during the 1990’s and is expected to
continue in the future. The …ndings inthis paper that support the main hypothesis presented above
(i.e. moral hazard as dominant cause of failure in concentrated ownership DI and agency costs in
DI with di¤use ownership and absence of secondary markets for stock), suggest that prudential su-
pervision of DI needs to be adapted to the characteristics of the corporate governance, the presence
or not of a secondary market for stock, and avoid misleading uniform standards of evaluation.
Our analysis, made explicit in the following pages, can be summarized in the following graph
(Figure 1). The cause of failure is determined indirectly by corporate governance. Depending
on the concentration of ownership one of two types of agency ”con‡icts” dominates. When the
ownership is concentrated or when ownership is di¤use and a secondary market for shares exist
(privately and publicly held stock banks), the con‡ict that dominates as cause of failure is the
con‡ict between shareholders and debtholders (moral hazard). When ownership is di¤use and no
secondary market for shares exist (government-owned stock banks and mutual banks) then the
con‡ict that dominates as cause of failure is the one that exist between shareholders/members and
2Figure 1:
mangers (expense preference or agency costs). Now we proceed to support these assertions. We
…rst start with commercial banks that correspond to the left branch of concentrated ownership and
the left branch underneat di¤use ownership (with secondary market for equity). Then we analyze
in sequence the cases of government owned banks and mutual banks that correspond to the right
branch of di¤use ownership with no secondary market for equity.
In this paper we are operating in the intersection of three branches of research literature: i)
The mostly stock bank oriented literature that focuses at the theoretical and empirical levels on
contracting under asymmetric information and hidden actions between principal depositors/debt
holders and agent shareholders ( henceforth, moral hazard). In mutual intermediaries the con‡ict
studied is the one that exists between net borrowers and net savers.3 ii) The literature that covers
contracting between shareholders or members of mutuals as principals and managers as agents
(henceforth, agency costs). iii) The literature, of mostly empirical nature, that attempts to explain
failure of depository institutions, mostly stock banks. We will be more speci…c about this literature
in later sections.
2 Theories of moral hazard and agency costs in DI: a review
2.1 The case of banks
The literature on failure of DI, mainly focused on commercial stock-owned banks, takes two main
approaches. One approach is to focus on improving quality of failure forecast. The other approach
3The expressions net-borrower and net-savers are terms borrowed from the credit union literature (e.g. Emmons
and Mueller, [34] and Shmit, [101] among other) to refer to members whose net position vis-à-vis their cooperative
is that of a borrower or a saver.
3attempts to explain failure from an economic point of view: what are the fundamental causes of
bankruptcies. Examples of the …rst approach is the ”early warning model” litterature based either
on accounting datas (represented among other by Lane, Looney and Wansley [61], Korobow and
Stuhr [58], West [109], Pettway and Sinkey [81], Martin [63], Sinkey [98]) or market data (Randall
[84], [83]). Most of this authors were interested in the statistical procedure that provided the most
reliable forecast of failure. Fundamental causes were less of a concern. A detailled review, albeit
aged, of the …rst group is provided by Demirgüc-Kunt [29].
Those authors preocupied with the fundamental causes of banking failures have focused on a
few main arguments. Although some take a rather exceptional approach, 4 most have identify two
major causes:
² Moral hazard arguments associated to option nature of the deposit insurance
² Moral hazard arguments associated to the option nature of the stock
These result from incentives to which shareholders are subject to exploit either the insurance
fund or liability holders. The most transparent theoretical explanation of the existence of these
incentives resides in the option nature of stock (as a long position in a call on the bank assets bought
from the liability holders, Merton [70]) and the deposit insurance contract (as a long position on
a put option bought by the shareholder from the deposit insurance fund, Merton [69]). We will
not enter into the details of this theory and its empirical tests since it is well documented in the
banking literature.5
Agency costs are generally considered to be an issue in the public corporation, but largely under
control through markets (for shares and for corporate control) or governance structures.6 Not
surprisingly, the presence of large sharholders in the ownership of the …rm, may they be private
outside investors, insider investor or instituional investors, plays a positive role in the e¢ciency
of the governance structure.7 Agency costs or EPB applied to the banking industry have also
been subject of considerable attention.8 While recognizing the similarity of the e¤ect of agency
costs on banks and non-bank …rms, the researchers have focused on a di¤erent twist of the issue.
Througout this litteratureon bank andnon-bank …rms, administrators are perceivedas conservative
decision makers that seek to preserve their employment through low risk investment decisions (e.g.
4Examples of these less-common approaches are Boyd and Graham [14] who relate failure to merger of the holding
company with nonbank …rms; Chou and Cebula [24] who study di¤erentials in failure rates accross states in the 1980’s
Savings and Loans crisis; Short [94] who attributes failure to management quality.
5E.g. Boyd, et al. [15]; Berger, Herring and Szegö [10]; Brewer [17]; Besanko and Kanatas [9]; Kambhu [54]; Short
[94]; Avery and Hanweck, [6]; Blair and Heggestad [13] are some examples. At the empirical level failures have been
associated deposit insurance in the United States (Wheelock and Wilson [111], Alston, Grove and Wheelock [2]) and
elsewhere (Milhaupt [73] in Japan). In general authors …nd that bank failure where highest in environments where
and times when deposit insurance exists.
6E.g. Fluck [38]; Noel and Tarhan [78]; Schleifer and Vishny [91]; Jensen [51]; Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, [7];
Jensen and Meckling [50].
7The presence of private outside investors was studied by Morck [74], McConnel and Servaes [68], [67]; that of
insider investors by Holderness and Sheehan [48], Schleifer and Vishny [91] and that of instituional investors by
Hansen and Hill [44], Chaganti and Damanpour [22].
8Examples of this work are Edwards [32], Hannan [42], Hannan and Mavinga [43], Saunders et al., [89]; Mullins,
[76]; Demsetz et al., [31]; Chen et al., [23].
4Hirschleifer and Thakor [47] for an elegant theoretical model focusing onmanagers’ risk aversion). If
this is so, the thinking goes, manager-shareholder agency con‡icts should results in lower insolvency
risk in banks. Some authors have argued for and tested the hypothesis that in banks with di¤use
ownership managerial risk aversion may in fact o¤set the excessive risk taking incentive that stems
from moral hazard.9 Results tend to support this hypothesis. For example, Anderson and Fraser [4]
report that total and bank speci…c risk are positively andsigni…cantly relatedto managerial holding.
Demsetz et al. [31] document a statistically signi…cant positive relationship between market risk
measures and managerial shareholding. Agency costs in stock insurance companies were studied
by Mayers and Smith ([66], [65]). Rasmusen [86] for mutuals; Saunders et al. [89], Mullins [76];
Demsetz et al. [31] for stock banks and Cebenoyan, et al. [21] for savings and loans, all have
argued that the greater the concentration of ownership, the greater is the incentive to take high
risk decisions, while the greater the di¤usion of ownership, the greater is the incentive to incur into
agency costs and to avoid high risk taking.
Compensation practices also serve to align managers’ interest with those of shareholders in
JSB. In particular, the introduction of performance incentives through distribution of stock options
has increased dramatically since the 1980‘s. The purpose of these schemes is, of course, to align
the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. Thus managerial conservatism in JSB is
neutralized, since managers now have an incentive to increase variance in underlying stock prices.
Wang [108] and Phelan [82] developed models of optimal compensation for managers to create this
alignement of interest. The use of stock options as a particular strategy for incentive schemes was
studied by Johnson and Tian ([53] and [52]), Carpenter [20], Rubinstein [88] and Kulatilaka and
Marcus [59]. It may be noted that in…scal year 1998, 97% of S&P500 …rms had issued stock options
to their managers. This would suggest a strong presence of similar schemes in the banking industry
that would cancel managers’ risk aversion. These incentive compatible compensation packages can
be, and are, applied not only to top management but also to other jobs where outside observation
is hard to achieve. However, the empirical results noted before suggest that the e¤ect is not strong
enough to cancel the empirically observed negative realtionship existing between managerial control
and bank risk taking.
2.1.1 The role of industrial groups
Although our research focuses on the relationship between onweship strcuture and causes of fail-
ure,there is a related issue that we cannot ignore: the presence of industrial groups of which banks
are often part. Particularly considering that our sample is based on an emerging market such as
Colombia. In most countries in the world it is a common feature that commercial banks are part of
a ”family owned industrial group.” This is a form of control, that cannot happen in Northamerican
countries due to legal restrictions, but is almost omniprescent throughout the world up to these
days. The impact of this particular form of control on bank solvency has not been studied.
Already in the 1970’s Shaw [93] proposed that in many ”developing countries” banks played
the function of channeling …nancing from the open …nancial market to the industrial groups. This
specialized function necessarily resulted in a high concentration of a bank’s credit portolio in the
groups relatedcompanies. Moral hazard con‡icts between liability holders and (group) shareholders
9See Anderson and Fraser, [4]; Demsetz et al., [31]; Mullins, [76]; Saunders et al., [89].
5that could result from this ”function” were not a point of concern to Shaw. This concentration had
two potential e¤ects:
² The correlation of failure and debt servicing capacity of group related companies can be
expected to be positive and high. This will increase systematic credit risk in the bank.
² The …nancing of group-related companies provided the owners of the bank more opportunities
to reduce the e¤ective equity stake (to use the term coined by Rojas Suarez and Weisbrod
[87]) in the bank’s capital. The higher e¤ective leverage that results from this reduced equity
stake will result in an increase in the volatility of the residual cash ‡ows and an increase in
the number of states of nature where it will be pro…table for the owner to exploit the option
feature of equity to its bene…t. Although, since the 1990’s many countries (and Colombia in
particular) have increased regulatory control over ”related lending”, this task is particularly
di¢cult in banks that are part of a family owned industrial group.
Both these arguments suggest that banks that belong to family owned industrial groups will
most likely manifest a higher level of moral hazard between the bank’s liability holders and its
sheareholders. Thus, if the presence of these groups will have an e¤ect, it will be to accentuate the
gravity of moral hazard to which are exposed liability holders. Whether this e¤ect is priced in the
rate of bank-issued debt instruments and deposits is another questionaltogether. In some cases this
pricing is not possible since interest rates are still controled by the state. Besides, the absence of a
variety of instruments in these underdeveloped …nancial markets, reduces the alternatives available
to investors.
From the point of view of agency costs, it is useful to note a common feature of groups: that
family members are strategically placed throughout the group (including the bank) providing the
owning family a considerable amount of con…dential information that serves to control mangers
e¢ciently. This should thus reduce the impact of agency costs on the institution’s failure risk.
2.2 The case of mutual DI
Mutual institutions with extreme di¤use ownership have been modeled di¤erently than stock banks
and savings and loans. Researchers have over the years made it clear that there are some important
contrasts between the way stock banks and DI institutions of di¤use ownership such as mutuals
carry out their decisions. Some authors have argued that mutual oganizations achieve a higher
e¢ciency because they avoid the con‡ict between shareholders and depositor (e.g. Valnek [104]).
These are arguments are similar in nature to those presented by Mayers and Smith ([66], [65]) to
di¤erentiate stock and mutual insurance companies. They support the hypothesis that the mutual
arises to internalize the con‡ict between cutomers (policy holders) and sharholders. A similar
line of argument was used (and modeled explicitly) to explain the appearance of credit mutuals
to internalize adverse selection problems in lenders-borrower relations by Smith and Stutzer [99].
However, two other con‡icts of interest are identi…ed in the theoretical and empirical literature
about mutual organizations and in particular FC. They are, the moral hazard that exists between
net borrower members and net creditor members and the agency con‡icts that exists between
6members (both net borrowers and net creditors) and managers (e.g. Emmons and Mueller [34]).10
Both types of con‡ict have been studied with some degree of detail.
The con‡ict of interest that exist between net borrower members and net creditor members, is
related to the fact that both types of members may be represented in the Board of Directors of
a typical mutual DI and thus are able to in‡uence the decision process in their bene…t. As noted
by Smith and Stutzer [99], Smith, Cargill and Meyer[102] and Taylor [103] among others, in a
FC members are both owners of the intermediary and consumers (suppliers) of its output (input).
Because the FC intermediates between its members-savers and its members-borrowers a con‡ict of
interests arises. Almost all subsequent work recognises that in this type of mutual intermediaries,
member (net savers versus net borrowers) con‡icts could a¤ect the manner in which it operates.11
The importance of this con‡ict is that there is a considerable shift of interests away from savers to
borrowers, something that doesn’t happen in a stock bank. Borrower dominated FC will tend to
overexpose the intermediary to project risk making them more suceptible to failure. By the type
of risk to which the DI is exposed, there is an evident parallel in the nature of the con‡ict between
net-borrowers and net-savers of a FC with the depositor-shareholder con‡ict.
From a more empirical point of view, Smith [101], basedon US credit union data, concludes that
on average neither net borrowers nor net creditors dominate. Patin and McNiel [80] …nd evidences
that more credit unions display a saver bias rather than the way around. However, one can expect
that some degree of variance exists within the population of FC, with some being dominated by
net creditors and others by net borrowers. In a study focusing on Latin American FC, Westley
and Sha¤er [110] …nd that institutions with a borrower bias display higher credit risk. This …nding
provides support to the moral hazard hypothesis outside of the United States.
The second con‡ict within a mutual DI, between members and manager, has been studied
under the theoretical umbrella of the expense preference behavior (EPB) theory of Williamson [112]
applied to …nancial intermediaries. Akella and Greenbaum [1] for example, focusing on mutual and
stock United States savings and loans, suggests that the larger the ownership di¤usion the more
accentuated is the EPB. This follows arguments by Vebrugge and Jahera [106] and Verbrugge and
Goldstein [105] and Mester [71] in the same direction regarding savings and loans. Mester [72]
goes on supporting this line of arguments from a perspective of ”agency costs.”12 The central
hypothesis behind this group of works is that the greater the di¤usion of ownership, the weaker is
the monitoring by owners and the greater is the degree of expense preference behavior by managers.
Papers by Emmons and Schmid [33], Keating and Keating [56], [57] present similar theoretical and
empirical results for the US credit union industry and by Hasan and Lozano [45] for the Spanish
”cajas.” Another dimension of the member-manager con‡ict is the one we have already addressed
when discussing stock banks: the risk aversion of managers. As noted, througout the litterature on
bank and non-bank …rms, administrators are perceived as conservative decision makers that seek to
10As noted at the beginning of this article, the use of the terms ”moral hazard” and ”agency con‡ict” has been
adopted to facilitate the presentation.
11E.g. Flannery, [36], Walker and Chandler [107], Smith, et al. [102], Black and Duggar [12], Navratil [77], Smith
[100], Emmons and Schmidt [33], Valnek [104].
12Strictly speaking there is a clear di¤erence between ”agency costs” and ”expense preference” that is based on
the theoretical roots and modeling techniques used to describe both concepts. However, as Emmons and Schmid [33]
and Akella and Greenbaum [1], in this paper we will make a loose use of both terms and consider them essentially
equivalent. We can take this liberty since we are not engaging in an explicit theoretical treatment of the issue.
7preserve their employment through low risk investment decisions (as modeled by Hirschleifer and
Thakor [47]). Ceteris paribus, in the case of a mutual intermediary, the manager-member agency
con‡icts should results in lower insolvency risk for the institution. In fact, Bhattacharya y Thakor
[11] argue that the low e¤ective control shareholders wield over managers in mutual intermediaries
such as credit unions and mutual S&L, makes these insitutions suitable for …nancing low risk
projects.
The implication of the arguments developed in the banking litterature around this issue is the
following: managers of mutual DI have an incentive to engage in a conservative risk strategy in
the management of the …rm. However, they are also exposed to incentives to engage in expense
preference behavior. A consequence of this combination of incentives is that mutual DI failure is
less likely to be due to net borrower-net lender moral hazard, and more likely to be due to expense
preference behavior exercised by manager. The balance is a purely empirical one, and is the one
we will test below. However, the implications for the purpose of regulation and supervision are
considerable, since they imply a completely di¤erent focus in the monitoring exercice. For example,
manager dominated DI arelikely tohold considerablecapital (as arisk averse strategyby managers),
display a safe record in a number of other risk related ratios, giving the supervisor a false sense of
security. At the same time, higher than expected ‡uctuations in cash ‡ows can generate a liquidity
crisis that precipitates the institution into a subsequent failure.13
2.3 The case of state-owned banks
One third category of DI must be considered: state owned bank. While stock banks and mutual
DI have been modeled extensively, there is a notable absence of theory to guide us. When the bank
is state-owned, both the share price and the market for corporate control disappear as disciplining
factors that limit expense-preference behavior. In a state-owned bank, no stakeholders has a direct
interest in its performance. Thus, state-ownership can be considered as an extreme case of share-
holder di¤usion which, as noted by Akella and Greenbaum [1], leads to weaknesses in governance.
Thus, unlike privately-owned stock banks (and like mutuals) expense-preference behavior may be
considerably more important, and, potential factor contributing to failure.
3 The role of markets and hierarchies to control principal-
agent con‡icts
Weak internal governance does not, however, necessarily imply runaway agency costs. Markets and
institutions have devised market-based or hierachy-based mechanisms that often compensate for
weak governance or control principal-agent types of con‡icts. The best studied and most obvious
case is that of the ”widely held” (to use La Porta et al.[60] nomenclature) public corporation,
that bene…ts from market mechanisms to compensate for weaknesses in its corporate governance.
In the widely-held stock bank, expense-preference behavior is controlled by: i) the stock market
13This is, by the way, exactly the scenario that happened repeatedly in cooperative banks and FC in the Colombian
crisis. In the case of UCONAL, a cooperative bank, it ceased payment and had to be nationalized only six months
after the Bank Superintendent gave it a clean health slate. Clearly a case of ”looking in the wrong direction.”
8whose price ‡uctuations re‡ect the investors perception about the quality of the intermediary’s
management; ii) the market for corporate control that through mergers and acquisitions removes
low performing management teams; iii) the labor market in which each manger must operate and
in which reputation plays a role.
The second source of conrol, the market for corporate control, has been subject of a fairly
intense research activity. In fact, three main explanations for takeover bids are distinguished in
the literature: synergy, discipline and hubris. Disciplinary aquistions are motivated by gains from
correcting non-value maximizing practices of managers in target …rms (Martin and McConnell [64],
Mork et al. [75], Grossman and Hart [41]). There is evidence that both the second and third
explanations hold for a large number of operations (Mork et al. [75], Lang, Stulz and Walkling
[62]). Both the market price of the stock and the market for M&Adetermines the eventual outcome.
Several studies relate Tobin’s q-ratio–a proxy for the investment opportunity set and an indicator
of management capability (e.g. Cudd and Duggal [26], Servaes [92] and Lang, Stulz and Walkling
[62])– to the position of …rm in mergers and acquisitions. Firms with a q < 1 tend to be the target
and …rms with a q > 1 tend to be the bidders in merger activity. These authors also …nd a positive
relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and the di¤erence in the q ratio of the bidder
and the target …rms, implying that acquisitions undertaken by high quality management …rms of
other low quality management …rms are rewarded by the market.
Unlike stock banks, mutual and community based DI (and government-controlled enterprises)
do not enjoy the disciplining e¤ect on management of market traded shares, nor the bene…t of a
market for corporate control. The labor market remains however as residual market mechanism,
although its e¢ciency to control agency costs is disputed despite Fama’s [35] contention. To com-
pensate for the lack market mechanisms, mutuals DI of many countries have created hierachical
mechanisms that serve to curb agency costs. It is precisely this line of reasoning that lead to the
creation of German auditing federations –to which every FC must be a¢liated by law. These feder-
ations were intended by their founders as substitutes for the market induced discipline present in a
stock bank.14 That is, the German auditing federations and other delegated monitoring structures
common to federative networks of FC, can be viewed as a hierarchical substitute for the absence
of market mechanisms (the stock market and the market for corporate control) that serve to disci-
pline managers of stock companies. We could provide a list of examples of hierarchical mechanisms
put into place by mutual and community based DI that appear to serve, among other purposes,
that of monitoring agency costs (Austria’s Rai¤aisen, France’s Credit Agricole and Mutuel, French
Canada’s Desjardins, Germany’s Landesbanken and Rai¤eisen, Holand’s Rabobank, Spain’s ”Ca-
jas”, etc.). Akella and Greenbaum [1] and Rasmusen, [86] see mutual DI as intermediaries where the
state –also a hierarchical mechanisms– substitutes shareholders in the supervision function, while in
Emmons and Schmid [33] it is another hierarchy, the sponsor, that assumes the role of controlling
agency costs. These three studies re‡ect the United States experience of corporate governance of
mutual intermediaries and in all three an emphasis is put on the need of an external supervisory
power to control agency costs, something quite at variance of standard supervisory practices for
commercial banks. The weakness or absence in developing countries of either market or hierachical
mechanisms can thus aggravate the severity of agency con‡icts that result from the di¤use control
14Although not in the form of auditing federations, other forms of monitoring of member FC exist in many other
movements organized around tightly bound networks. See Jäger [49] for a detailed analysis along this line of thinking.
9and resulting weak governance. The absence of both market based or hierarchical mechanisms to
curb expense-preference behavior by managers in institutions with weak governance due to di¤use
ownership, may thus convert agency con‡icts into a powerful destabilizing factor. Unfortunately in
this paper we cannot empirically address the role of these mechanisms on the e¢ciency of corporate
governance and the control of agency costs. The only e¤ective mechanisms available in that country
is the stock market, and for the purpose of controlling agency costs, largely super‡uous due to the
closely held nature of the banks. Among mutuals, no hierachical mechanism exists and all mutual
DI are subject to the same regime. The only sub-group of DI studied here and subject to some
amount of hierarchical control are the state-owned banks. This would suggest that state-owned
banks could be less subject to agency costs problems than mutual DI.
This picture of banks (or real sector corporations) with di¤ering degrees of concentration of
control by owners, with a continuum of institutions ranging from highly di¤use stock ownership
to concentrated ownership, becomes biased in most emerging market. For practical purposes, in
most developing countries banks are of closed ownership. Although they are often traded in the
local stock markets or inthe international stock markets as American Depository Receipts (ADR) or
International Depository Receipts(IDR), the ‡oatingportionis small, with one or afewshareholders
holding substantial portion of the outstanding stock. In this context it is interesting to note the
results of Gibson [40] who …nds that CEOs of emerging market …rms are more likely to lose their
jobs when their …rms performance is poor, suggesting that corporate governance is not ine¤ective
in emerging markets. The magnitude of the relationship is surprisingly similar to what Kaplan
[55] found for the United States. This suggests that concentrated ownership results in corporate
governance in emerging markets appears to be as e¤ective as that of a well developed market,
despite the absence of deep market for mergers and, presumably, less e¢cient market for labour.
Several other studies (La Porta et al. [60] and Claessens et al. [25], among others) point to the high
concentration of ownership in emerging market …rms, and to the fact that the main agency con‡ict
there is not between owners and managers but between majority and minority shareholders. In the
Colombian case studied in this paper, all stock banks not owned by the state, a –or a small group
of– shareholder(s) control at least 50% of the shares issued. For this reason we have not included
measures of concentration in the statistical analysis. Instead, all stock banks not controlled by the
state are considered, using La Porta et al. [60] code, as ”family or individually owned”
4 Data
We use two data set: one for Colombian commercial banks and one for Colombian FC. The …rst
data set covered the Colombian banking system : A total of 38 institutions with data from March
1980 until December 1999, both private and public institution. The data are semiannual up to 1988
and quarterly from 1989 to 1999. To facilitate the convergence process of the nonlinear models,
we eliminated both 1% extremes of the distribution of each ratio that was computed. Although
this information might be very valuable, we prefer to eliminate some observations to increase the
stability of the regressors. For reasons noted above, we have divided the sample of stock banks into
privately-owned and government-owned banks. Although for the banking sector the data available
allowed the computation of a much larger set of variables than for the FC sector, we only used
ratios that were computable for both types of institutions.
10The second data set consist of FC that provide data to the Colombian Confederation of Co-
operatives (CONFECOOP). We used the annual …nancial statements (balance sheet and income
statement) of 154 …nancial cooperatives (FC) from 1993 to 1998, and monthly data for June, July,
August and September of 1998 (The FC crisis period).15 We also truncated the distribution to
eliminate both 1% tails. The FC in our sample hold over 90% of the sectors’ assets but control a
proportion considerable smaller of the FC movement membership.
4.1 De…nition of variables
We considered 30 candidate variables with which to compute various ratios of interest.16 In tables
1-a and 1-b we present statistics for key ratios considered in this analysis. There we have included
means, standard deviations and some distributional characteristics for each of the ratios that were
computed and considered as potential candidates for use in the statistical tests. In tables 2-a and
2-b we also present means and standard errors of all these variables for healthy and failed FC and
banks respectively, as well as the results of a test of di¤erences between the means of healthy and
failed institutions. The values under the column of ”failed” are those obtained when the DI had
efectively failed. All observation for the failed intsitution before the failure event were included
in the statistics under the ”healthy” column.17 In all tables we have divided the ratios into three
groups: control ratios; ratios that measure moral hazard, mostly re‡ecting risk position of the DI;
and ratios that measure agency costs, mostly in the form of type of assets, salaries and operating
expenses. We provide more explanations about these three groups later on. Within these groups
there are ratios that are a good proxy of one of the con‡icts for one of the institutions but not
for the other. An example of this is, for reason we will explain later, the ration of Deposits over
Credits. However, for comparison purposes we have kept the format of the tables constant. The
reader may note that most variables, including control variables, moral hazard and agency costs
proxies, display signi…cant di¤erences in mean according to a di¤erences test. The ratios …nally
chosen in the statistical model arede…ned belowand their interpretation is presentedinTable 3. We
support our choice of ratios used in the statistical procedures presenting research that considered
each of these ratios in di¤erent contexts, but in particular in the analysis of DI failures. Given the
results of the di¤erences test it is not surprising to see that numerous coe¢cients of variables that
proxy for moral hazard and agency costs are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
As a …rst approach it is interesting to comment on the tests of di¤erences presented in tables
15The reader might be uncomfortable with the di¤erences of periods covered for both types of institutions. This is
unavoidable. Over the period 1993 to 1998, only four bank failed or run into serious di¢culties, thus no meaningful
estimation would have been possible. On the other hand, there is no data available for FC before 1993. Thus a
comparison of ”causes” of failures for the banking and FC sectors can only be made using these di¤erent, albeit
overlapping, periods.
16Much more variables could be available if only latter-year data would be used. However, for the early 1980’s for
banks and the mid 1990’s for FC, data was highly aggregated. The use of these early years are of interest –at the
cost of less variables available– due to the large number bank failures in the early 1980’s and FC failures starting
1997.
17Since the event failure most likely arrives after a period of deterioration in the ratios for the DI in troubles, this
means that the statistics shown under the ”healthy” column are somewhat biased toward values of failed institutions.
This should reduce the power of the di¤erence test. However, as the test statistics show, the di¤erences are robust
enough as not to be greatly a¤ected by this bias, showing a high level of signi…cance regardless.
112a-b. Most variables in the three groups pass the test of di¤erences at quite high signi…cance level,
with the control variables diplaying less signi…cant di¤erences. However, there are some interesting
patterns that present themselves when taking a closer look at the numbers. Take the variables
measuring agency costs (the last panel). In the case of FC invariably the failed take values that
would suggest a higher level of agency costs and the same is true for banks. Examples are Non-
…nancial costs/Assets, Deposits/Credits and Personnel Expenses/Assets which are all larger for
failed DI and signi…cantly di¤erent from those of healthy DI. If we analyze the group of ratios
used to proxy moral hazard we observe a similar pattern. Examples are the Interest Rate GAP,
Financial Income/Assets and Capital Exposure (Reserves+Unperforming Assets+Goods Received
in Payment/Capital), all larger and signi…cantly di¤erent for the failed DI. However, as we will see
later, when both groups of variables are confronted as explanatory of failure one group tends to
be overshadowed by the other. This …rst statistical results suggests that both moral hazard and
agency costs may contribute to failure in DI of concentrated or di¤use ownership, however their
relative importance as determinant of failure varies between institutions. This, of course, would be
consistent with the theory reviewed earlier on.
4.1.1 Dependent variable
Failure
The dependent variables, failure, was obtained by classifying as failed DI those who e¤ectively
failed (where intervened or liquidated). Commercial banks were considered as failed when they
were intervened, nationalized or a recapitalization was ordered by the Superintendency of Banks
(as a result of being technically insolvent).Thus in our case the dummy variable represents o¢cial
government intervention. The failures of banks happened mostly –but not exclusively- with two
crisis in the banking sector around the years 1985 and 1998. The failures of FC happened mostly
with a crisis in the sector in 1998. The list of failure events for both the FCand banking sectors are
provided in tables 5-a and 5-b. Thus, for each …nancial intermediary (FC or bank) the dependent
variable takes the value of zero as long as the institution is healthy, and if the intermediary fails
it takes the value of one and missing from there on to the end of the sample period.18 If the
intermediary does not fail, the data is truncated at the end of thesample periodwithall observations
of the dependent variable set to zero. See Shumway [95] for a detailed description of this sort of
arrangement in dichotomous variable data bases. The fact that the data of non-failedintermediaries
is truncated at the end of the sample period makes this a censored data. As the reader may note
from table 4-a, only two FC were considered as ”failed” after December 1998 (last observation in
the data base), so they were considered as healthy DI in the estimation.
The reader may also note the long list of ”failed” DI over the 20 year period covered in the
study. This list re‡ects the relatively rigorous regulatory and supervisory policy applied by the
banking authorities of that country since de beginning of the 1980. In Colombia, unlike many other
developing countries, banks are rarely ”rescued” with capital injection by the state that keep the
institution arti…cially alive. When banks face either default in payment obligations or do not meet
capital standards (or shareholder are unwilling to put up capital to meet standards), they are likely
18Institutions that failed and then, after restructuring, capitalization and perhaps re-privatization, restarted op-
erations, and after allowing a recuperation period of at least 3 years, where listed as a ”new” sample with missing
values before the reintroduction and the value of zero for the variable failure.
12to be intervened, and taken over by the Deposit Insurance Fund. After –not always successful–
restructuring these banks are often again sold to private interests. This also explains the repeated
listing of some banks in Table 5. A similar policy, although somewhat more lenient due to the
social e¤ect of the failure of FC, has been applied to mutual DI. The di¤erence resides in that
FC, instead of being nationalized for restructuring and reprivatization, is put under administration
of an intervenor appointed by the supervisory body. This policy justi…es our choice of dummy
variable where ”failure” results when the supervisory authority intervenes the institution. This
policy presents an additional bene…t for the research in terms of quality of the data. In Colombia
it is in general unlikely that failed institutions –i.e. DI for which the dummy takes the value of 1.0–
are kept under the control of their original owners but are in a state of deterioration, as could be
the case in many other developing countries. A certain problem presents itself with state-owned
banks, where the government may support ailing institutions with capital injections eliminating the
threat of intervention by the banking authority. This may introduce a certain classi…cation error in
the data for these banks, in the sense that failing institutions are classi…ed as healthy.
4.1.2 Control variables
The control variables are variables we cannot associate speci…cally with neither the AC nor the MH
hypothesis, but that, as extant literature suggests, may contribute to a …nancial intermediary’s
insolvency. We note below some relevant references that justify their use. Under control variables
we also included those that may be in‡uenced by both MH and AC, but in opposite directions. For
example, the return on assets (ROA) should be lower with high AC or EPB, but higher if with high
MH (resulting from de acquisition of high-risk high expected return assets). In these cases, the net
e¤ect is not known. We are considering three control variables: liquidity, size and pro…tability of
the institutions:
Liquidity
1. Liquid assets/Total assets (DISPONIB) (Wheelock and Wilson [111], Saunders and Wilson
[90], Barth et al. [8]): The variable DISPONIB is measuring the proportion of the liquid assets in
the portfolio of assets. We expect a negative relationship between the probability of failure and this
measure of liquidity.
Size
2. Logarithm of total assets (LOGA) (Calomiris and Mason [18], Weelock and Wilson [111],
Papoulias and Theodossiou [79], Brewer [16], Gallo, Apilado and Kolari [39], Hassan [46], Demsetz,
Saidenberg and Strahan [30], Saunders, Strock and Travlos [89]. This ratio is a measure of diver-
si…cation potential. A diversi…ed institution normally presents a lower credit risk, as its activities
are present in a wider range of industries and products, thus reducing insolvency risk. On the
other side, the importance of the assets may be associated with excessive real estate investments (in
nicer, more prestigious o¢ces), a percking strategy often use by managers that may contribute to
insolvency by binding resources in unproductive assets. Further, much of the ”expense preference”
literature (Akella and Greenbaum [1], Keating and Keating [56], [57]) suggests greater AC through
the expansion of inputs and outputs beyond pro…t maximizing levels.
Pro…tability
3. Return on assets (ROA) (Flannery and Sorescu [37], Barth et al. [8], Avery and Hanweck
[6], Altman [3], Sinkey [98]): The ROA has a di¤erent interpretation if considering AC or MH. If
13interpreted in the context of AC, a lower return means the institution had higher costs, wasting its
resources. Thus, a lower return is a sign of greater AC. On the other hand, if interpreted in the
context of MH, a higher return might mean the institution took on more risk, which should result
in a higher expected return.
Group control
4. As noted in the introduction, theoretical arguments suggest that banks belonging to a family
owned industrial group will be exposed to higher moral hazard. Thus, a dummy was created that
took value of 1 for all observations in which the banks was under the control of one of these groups
and 0 otherwise. For any one bank, the dummy can take di¤erent values throughout the sampling
period as banks changed control between domestic private owners, foreign private owners and the
state. Banks controled by a foreign banking group were given the value of zero. We expect to
observe a positive and signi…cative sign for the coe¢cient. The inclusion of this variable in the
regression could have the e¤ect of reducing the explanatory power of the ”moral hazard” measures,
since according to theory they should be positively correlated (ownership by group yields higher
moral hazard). To control for this eventuality, regressions where run with and without this dummy
variable. This variable was not included in the current estimations since thiscorporate control histoy
data es still in process of being collected.
Foreign control
5. Banks that are controled by foreign entities (usually foreign banks) were given a value of 1
andall other institutions the value of zero. This variable was not included in the current estimations
since this corporate control histoy data es still in process of being collected.
4.1.3 Moral hazard (MH) variables
The variables used to proxy MH had to be chosen carefuly. One of the objecives in choosing proxies
should be that they have the same meaning in the di¤erent DI under study. There are several issues
that a¤ect the choice of an appropiate proxy of MH. The three issues we will address are: i) the
nature of the incentives; ii) feasibility of using particular forms of risk to engage in MH; and iii)
potential for measurement errors.
The nature of the incentives
Stock banks(widely held or family owned) are subject to incentives toengage inMH by means of
any type ofriskexposure thatmay incresethe varianceandexpected valueof the returndistribution.
Any form of risk taking may meet this objective including credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity
risk, o¤-balance sheet activites, etc. Instead, as noted earlier on, mutual intermediaries the absence
of a shareholder-depositor con‡ict (Valnek, [104]) and the weight of risk averse managers interest in
the decision making process, should result in a relatively low-risk style of management (Rasmusen
[86]). However, borrower dominate FC bias the decision process in favor of borrowers in terms of
information gathering, quality of guarantees, etc. Thus, in FC moral hazard takes a very concrete
form: credit risk. Other forms of risk play no role in these models. Thus, a key proxy that takes
the same meaniang in the di¤erent inswtitutions is credit risk.
Feasibility of using particular forms of risk to engage in moral hazard
A tipical bank may be able to increase exposure to risk with the goal of obtaining higher
mean and variance returns by di¤erent means. However, the supervisory environment and market
conditions may limit opportunities. Most common on-balance sheet means of increasing risk are
14through credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk and leverage. O¤-balance sheet opporuntities are
very limited in a tipical emerging market due toestablishedbanking practices, limits in the activites
allowed by regulators and availability of contingent claim instruments. The portfolio of loans, due
to information advantages available to the bank, is by far the instrument which provides the highest
latitude to increase risk exposure without being detected by the supervisor. Speculating with other
forms of risk, such as liquidity or interest rate risk, is a less obvious operation in an emerging
market, for several reasons. First, they are easier to detect by the supervisor. Second, speculating
with interest rate risk requires quick shifts in exposure with instruments that may not be available
in the local market. Third –as is the case for the period covered in this study– asset and liability
rates may be subject to controls known under the general name of ”…nancial repression”. Under
these regimes, rates are not allowed to ‡uctuate and the yield curve that re‡ect expected future
rates in the economy is absent for any practical purpose. Colombia undertook its most serious
…nancial liberalization in the early 1990’s, right in the middle of our study period. Thus, for the
…rst portion of our sample, possibilities of speculating with interest rates was very limited to say
the least.
One proxy often used in the litteraure on bank failure (Weelock and Wilson [111], Papoulias
and Theodossiou [79], Barth et al. [8], Avery and Hanweck [6], Altman [3], Sinkey [97] to cite
just a few) and thus important to consider is leverage. In the case of Colombia, capitalization
measurableby accountingdata(oursourceof data) is veryclosely monitored by theSuperintendency
of Banks. Banks have often been ordered to recapitalize or even intervened on the simple projection
of capitalization falling under the standards existing at the time –and the unwilligness of owners to
put up fresh capital. Thus banks have relatively little latitude to speculate with leverage. Below
we will note other arguments that conspire against the use of leverage data.
A related issue is sophistication of management. Sophistication may not be an issue in stock
or state-owned banks, but it is in FC. Speculating with interest rate risk, for example, requires
a sophistication on the side of management that may not allways be available in this type of
institutions. In fact, it is common among FC managers that they do not manage interst rates risk
at all, leave alone to speculate with rates.
Potential for measurement errors
Potential for measurement errors is particularly serious in our situation. The only data available
is accounting data as reported to the Superintendency of Banks. Any market-based adjustment,
often used in similar research carried out in industrialized countries, is simply not available. Take
leverage ratios again. Firt, we have no way to adjust capital to market value. Second, and perhaps
more importantly Rojas Suarez and Weissbrod [87] have shown that banks owners can reduce
e¤ective capitalization privately leveraging their own equity position with funds originated in the
bank iteself. While this practice is explicitly prohibited by the Superintendency of Banks, e¤ective
control is di¢cult in the complex corporate structures of …nancial and industrial ”groups” used in
Colombia as in many other emerging markets. Thus shareholders can introduce hidden leverage
that is not re‡ected in the accounting data compiled and observed by the Superintendency of
Banks.19 One further complication is that leverage does not have the same meaning in banks (stock
19It is interesting to note that recently the Colombian Superintendency of Banks has modi…ed its supervision
practices shifting from a division by type of institution (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, etc.) into one
by …nancial group. As a result all types of …nancial intermediaries under same group are supervised by the same
team that now is much more capable of detecting practices of supervision arbitrage.
15or state-owned) as in FC. In the latter, leverage may, for so-called ”closed” FC, be zero since their
”liabilities”consist of exclusively sharecontributions. Infact, the largest FCthat failed in Colombia
was a ”closed” one, with no deposits. A quick perusal of the capitalization ratios shown in Table 1
reveals that average capitalization is several times higher in FC than in private stock banks.
The arguments presented above suggest that the form of risk that should be captured by the
proxies for moral hazardare those that measure credit risk exposure. They are the ones that appear
to present the least mesurement error and have a consistent interpretation accros the di¤erent form
of institutions under study. We use two:
Credit risk
4. Unproductive assets as a proportion of total assets (ACTIMPRO) (Calomiris and Mason [18],
Angbazo [5], Flannery and Sorescu [37])
Leverage
5. Capital/Deposits (PATDEP). Di¤erent measures of leverage were used by Weelock and
Wilson [111], Papoulias and Theodossiou [79], Barth et al. [8], Avery and Hanweck [6], Altman [3],
Sinkey [97] to cite just a few.
4.1.4 Agency costs (AC) variables
These proxies are somewhat less problematic that theones usedtomeasure MH. First, unfortunately
they are not object of particular attention by supervisors, and thus managers are less likely to
attempt to mask them. Second, they are easier to observe directly in accounting data, provided
that these meet some minimum standards. We kept two variables to measure agency costs. Existing
litterature (Emmons and Schmidt [33], Keating and Keating [56] [57], Akella and Greenbaum [1])
while testing EPB in mutuals have focused on variables that re‡ect size and non-…nancial expenses.
For reasons noted above we have included size under the control variables.
Measures of agency costs
6. Deposits/Credits (DEPCART): This is a quite controversial ratio. In the context of FC this
ratio is an indicator of the use managers make of the funds invested by members. A low ratio
suggests that most funds are used to provide credit to their members. On the contrary, a high ratio
suggests that those funds are used to acquire other assets such as real estate, and other …nancial
investments such as functional subsidiaries. A high ratio has been considered in the Colombian
context as an indicator of agency costs and a measure of the extent of ”non core business” (credit
to members) in which the FChas engaged. The variance on this ratio can be very large. FCare not
subject to any limitation on the amount of credit that can be issued. The result is that often FC
allocate each dollar of deposits and equity contributions, so they can place more credits than what
they receive in deposits yielding very low ratios. Other FC may use important portions of deposits
in …xed assets and in corporate investment, yielding very high ratios. In the context of banking, the
inverse of this ratio has often been used to measure credit risk in bank failure analysis, a high ratio
would suggest a high proportion non risky assets and thus a safer DI (e.g. Wheelock and Wilson
[111]). We have kept the ratio as a measure of agency costs because it is a key indicator used by
supervisors of FC in appraising quality of management.
8. Intermediation margin/Operating costs (SUFMARG): A measure of the e¢ciency of man-
agement in terms of their success to maintain operating costs with the limits of the intermediation
margin available to …nance these costs.
165 Statistical methodology
The statistical methodology used in this work is based on the theory of hazard adaptaded for
estimation using Logit as proposed by Shumway [96].20 This methodology allows for the use of
dichotomous variables as dependent variable and, as a bonus, permits to estimate the bankruptcy
probability for all units in the sample. The de…nition of failure is to have a last observation (or
bankruptcy de…ned by any other criterion) located before the last period of the sample.




where X is the matrix of variables that explain the probability of failure. ® is the parameters
vector that is associated to the matrix X: The matrix X will consist of variables measuring MH,
AC and other control variables considered essential to explain FC failure. The vector X can thus
be decomposed into three major elements:
² proxy variables for moral hazard, XH
² proxy variables for agency costs, XA
² control variables, XC




5.1 Confronting causes of failures
Both MH and AC are factors that can be expected to in‡uence failure in FC. Whether each of
these two factors are indeed important can be established using a Wald variable exclusion test on
the variables proxies of MH and AC of equation 1. This test is of interest in itself, and might
provide an indication of the relative importance of each factor as a determinant of failure by the
relative degree of signi…cance of the Wald test for the MH and AC variables. However, it is a
poor instrument to do so. Thus, in order to test the relative in‡uence of the set of variables that
represent MH and AC we use three di¤erent approaches:
1. Wald and LR tests. We assume that the models are nested and test for the signi¢cance of
eliminating one or the other set of explanatory variables using the Wald and LR tests.
2. Information criteria (IC): This approachis suggested for count data as a procedure for testing
non-nested models by Cameron and Trivedi [19] among others. The technique consists in
computing Akaike type ofICexcluding the components in dispute. Then the ICis recomputed
20This simpli…cation is based on the realization that a multiperiod logit model (as used in this work) is equivalent
to a discrete-time hazard model. See Proposition 1 in Shumway [96].
21Note that 2, augmented by an error term, is also the equation of a Logit model.
17adding one and the other group of variables. We do not use the standard Akaike information
criteria because it does not incorporate into the penalty function the number observations
used in the estimation. This number varies slightly from model to model due to availability
of data to compute the ratios. Instead we employ two IC, the Schwarz (bayesian) (SIC)
and the Consistent Akaike (CAIC) criteria. The second contains a slightly more sever penalty
function than the …rst. CAIC= ¡2lnL+(1+lnn)k, where L is the value ofthe log-likelyhood
function, n is the number of observations and k is the number of coe¢cients. As is standard in
Akaike information criteria, a smaller CAIC is better, which occurs when the change in value
in lnL is larger than the change in the penalty function (1 + lnn)k. The model displaying
the smallest SIC or CAIC is considered to describe better the data.
3. Gauss-Newton regression (GNR): Another test of relative in‡uence can be done using arti…cial
or Gauss Newton or arti…cial regressions . In essence, the problem of relative weight is similar
to a non-nested model speci…cation test. Suppose that the competing models are:
H1 : yt =
1
1+ eXAt¯A+ut and H2 : yt =
1
1 +eXHt¯H+vt (3)
We can perform an arti…cial nesting, inwhich thetwo competing Logit regressions are embedded
into a more general model
HC : yt =
1
1+ e(1¡®)XAt¯A+®XHt¯H+vt +vt (4)
where ® nests the two models. An ® close to zero means agency costs variables dominate moral
hazard variables for the FC. The problem with this model is that it is not estimable because not all
parameters are separately identi…able. In model (4) the intercept and the coe¢cients of all control
variables should be present in either formulation but cannot be part of the two vectors XAt and
XHt. One solution to this problem was suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon [27]. Applying this
technique to our problem would consist of replacing ¯M by b ¯M, the Logit estimate of ¯M. Thus
HC becomes:




A test of the nul hypothesis that ® = 0 is a standard t-test. The objective is to verify the
relative power of two alternative models (moral hazard versus agency costs) in which the dependent
variable is the same. We make sure that both models are non-nested by including two speci…c
variables of AC in the …rst model and two speci…c variables of MH in the second, so that each
model has two distinctive regressors. As the right hand side of equation is non-linear, we use a
P-tests instead of a J-test (Davidson, MacKinnon [28], p. 384). The P-Test consists studying the
relevance of the residuals of the alternative model to explain the probability of failure. Equation
5 was estimated using non-linear least squares, which in the case of the statistical software used
in this work, is estimated using the Gauss-Newton algorithm. See Cameron and Trivedi [19] (pp.
88-91) for a discussion on the suitability of using non-linear least squares in the estimation of count
data with logistic distribution.
186 Statistical results
We now present the main results on the test that compare the behavior of the three types of
institutions. These are presented in Table 6 where we display the estimated coe¢cients for the
private banking, state banking and FC systems. We focus here on the third regression of this table
with the title ”both e¤ects” presented in the third panel of the table. At a …rst glance it is possible
to note that the signs of the regression coe¢cients for FC resemble more those of government-owned
banksthanthose ofprivately-owned banks. As wehave noted in Section 3, government-owned banks
may display weaknesses in its governance structure similar to those of FC. However, due to the fact
that they are subject to some hierarchical controls, the e¤ect could be expected to be weaker. Thus
the relevance of agency costs as a factor that contributes to insolvency appears to be related to the
strength or weakness of the governance structure, independent of the legal form of the institution.
However, in contrast to FC, the coe¢cient for the control variable size (Log of assets) is negative,
implying that size reduces signi…cantly the insolvency risk of government-owned banks and that in
these the diversi…cation argument dominates. For FC, the coe¢cient is positive and signi…cant at
least 5%. Since the t-statistic computed is two-tailed, this means that for the Colombian sample the
expense-preference behavior of mangers dominates the bene…ts from diversi…cation. This is a result
that is consistent with that of the US-based mutual S&LA studied by Akella and Greenbaum [1].
The other control variables (liquidity and ROA) are not signi…cant for FC, but highly signi…cant
(and of expected sign) for government and privately-owned banks.
Of the two MH variables only one, proportion of unproductive assets, is signi…cant but of oppo-
site sign than expected! This suggests that unproductive assets (credit risk taking) did not cause
failure. Even more, those that failed had better assets than those that didn’t. Such a result would
have made no sense in the case of banks. They are expected to fail because unperforming portfolios
of credits (or a liquidity crisis). However, the same result can easily be explained in the case of FC,
where expense-preference behavior is so important and di¢cult to control. Capitalization did not
explain failure either. However, both variables have a strong explanatory power for government-
owned banks with signs that are consistent with expectation. For private banks the results are less
clear but the signs of the coe¢cients are also as expected.
Both CA variables are signi…cant and with sign consistent with expectations for FC. Both
Deposits/Credits and Financial margin/operating costs explain failure. In words this means: i) FC
thatfailedinvested theirfunds in activities andassets otherthancredit to theirmembers; ii) FCthat
failed used a larger proportion of the intermediation margin in operating costs. In fact the average
failed institution, at the moment of failure was only covering 63.7% of its operating costs from
intermediationmargin, whilethehealthy FCusedonly25% of its intermediationmarginin operating
expenses (see table 2-a, last line).22 The results for banks are the following: in privately-owned
22We have often received a comment to this result, and it is the following: The high value of Deposits/Credits was
in part due to large real estate investments, and that these were due to a ”speculative” behavior of FC leaders, who
acquired real estate assets in a rising markets. We agree generally on this interpretation of the ratio. However, a
closer look of those real estate assets actually acquired by the FC suggests that they were mostly in o¢ces and other
non-earning real estate assets. Very little of these assets where speculative and marketable real estate assets. Some
extreme cases are: golf courts, horse stables and over-sized o¢ce buildings totally out of proportion with the size
or the economic status of the membership. Another argument advanced was that ”nice” and impressive buildings
were necessary to attract membership. There is a whole list of reasons that could be presented to demonstrate the
fallaciousness of this argument.
19banks, neither coe¢cient is signi…cant suggesting what theory (and regulators) has long sustained,
agency con‡icts, because they are controllable, do not play a determinant role in bank insolvency.
The results are less evident for government-owned banks. The coe¢cient for Deposits/Credit is
signi…cant and takes the sign suggested by expense-preference theory. However that for Financial
margin/Administrative costs is opposite to expectation. Only a more careful analysis and the use
of alternative ratios in the statistical procedure would allow us to perform a correct interpretation
of this result.
To compare in a more direct fashion the relative importance of moral hazard and agency costs
factors as an explanation of failure we performed Wald and Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests. The latter
requires re-estimation of the restricted models. This is the purpose of presenting regressions ”moral
hazard models” (…rst panel) and ”cost of agency model” (second panel). It is useful to repeat here
the fourth and …fth panels of the table:
Institution FC Gov.Bank Priv.Bank
Wald Test
Hypothesis: MH coe¢cients = 0 Value 4,066 53,174 22,362
Signi…cance 13,10% 0,00% 0,00%
Hypothesis: CA coe…cients = 0 Value 8,239 55,817 5,605
Signi…cance 1,63% 0,00% 6,07%
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test
Hypothesis: MH coe…cients = 0 Value 13,519 100,402 66,265
Signi…cance 0,12% 0,00% 0,00%
Hypothesis: CA coe…cients = 0 Value 24,447 127,757 5,104
Signi…cance 0,00% 0,00% 7,79%
This summary table reveals that in most cases both MH and AC variables are signi…cant in
explaining failure. However, some re…nement in the interpretation is possible. For FC the LR tests
for the MH variables are numerically small compared with banks either private or government-
owned. On the other the LR for CA variables is relatively large for FC and small for private
banks. Government-owned banks display large and highly signi…cant LR for both MH and CA
variables suggesting that both are important determinants of failure. Wald tests do not yield
equally clear results, in particular with respect to private banks in that the test statistic is small
and non signi…cant in for both the MH and CAvariables for these institutions. However, for FC the
Wald statistic suggests no signi…cance for MH variables and signi…cance for the CA variables. Thus
this test also supports the hypothesis that CA and not MH are the principal determinants of FC
failure. To note is also the importance of AC variables in explaining failure of government-owned
banks.
The interpretation of the AIC tests is that the lesser the Akaike criterion, the more appropriate
is the model. As can be seen in panels 6 and 7 of Table 6, the most adequate model for FCconsiders
only the variables measuring the agency costs (imposing that the coe¢cients associated to variables
measuring MH are equal to zero). The same behavior is observed for public banks. On the contrary,
private banks are more adequately represented by the MH model than the AC model. Note that
the three types of institutions present greater Akaike statistics when including both MC and AC
variables.
To complete our estimations, we performed Gauss-Newton regressions and computed the J-
20tests. We note that for FC the AC variables are still signi…cant although all the variables of the
moral hazard were considered in the model, the t-statistic observed was signi…cant at the 5% level
(t-statistic of -2,502). The t-statistic was still stronger for State-banks. On the contrary, we see
that these variables are not signi…cant (t-statistic of -0,731) in the prediction of the probability of
failure of private banks. For these institutions, we see that the moral hazard problem is much more
signi…cant (t-statistic of -1,78) than the AC problem.
We canthenconclude that, all tests performede support unambiguously and without contradiction
the hypothesis that in …nancial cooperatives CA variables play a signi…cant and more important role
in explaining failure than MH variables. On the other hand that the moral hazard problem is of
extreme relevance only for private banks.
7 ”Quality” of mangement, an alternative hypothesis ex-
plaining failure
It has been argued that the main reason for the failure of mutuals is ”poor quality of management
(QM).” Indeed, Short [94] attributes failure of United States based Savings and Loans to manage-
ment quality and multinational orgnizations see in QM as one of the key causes of failure of FC in
developing countries (and in particular in Latin America). The rationale behind this explanation
is that smaller institutions based in communities do not attract, or are uncapable to pay for, well
trained management. By extention, the phenomenon should be particularly serious in rural-based
mutual institutions where the pool of trained personnel is limited. The QM hypothesis, while lack-
ing the sophisticated theoretical support that enjoy the MH and AC hypothesis, cannot be ignored
in comparing mutual and joint stock banks. A considerable proportion of mutual intermediaries are
small and rural based, and often depend on volunteers to integrate their governance bodies such
as the Board of Directors. Management will most likely be drawn from a local pool of available
skills und it will often be unlikely that these individuals posess the sophisticated training of a large
city bank managers or will count with the backing of a bank headquarters technical skills. Under
these circumstances it is likely that members of management and governancer bodies lack the train-
ing and sophistication required for the positions. This would result in a relatively poorer quality
of management among FC and higher likelihood of failure due to errors in management. On the
contrary, QM should play no or insigni…cat role as a determinat of failure of private banks. As
usual, predictions are more ambiguous for public banks. They are likely to attract lower quality of
management than private banks but better quali…ed personnel than FC.
We tested and confronted the hypothesis that quality of management (QM) was the dominant
factor in explaining failure. Thus all models were run with proxies of QM and the same tests
performed confronting this hypothesis with that of AC and MH separately. That is, we confronted
pairs QM-AC and QM-MH in addition to AC-MH. As proxies for QM we used the ratio of labor
expenses to assets and a size variable orthogonalized for measures of AC ( Deposits/credits and
intermediation margin/operating costs)23 Results (not shown) are as follows:
23The use of Tobin’s q-ratio as an indicator of management capability (e.g. Cudd and Duggal [26], Servaes [92]
and Lang, Stulz and Walkling [62]) is not possible due to the impossibility of computing this ration in FC and many
private banks with stock not traded in the exchanges.
21² In the case of FC, of the two proxies of QM used, labor expenses is not signi…cant and the
orthogonalized measure ofsize is signi…cant only inthe case when all othervariables measuring
MH and AC are included, and then the sign is positive (the larger the size the higher the risk
of failure), which is contrary to what one should expect if QM were a factor. In the case of
private banks measures of QM have no e¤ect on failure and in the case of public banks the
measures of QM are negatively and signi…cantly related to failure (only case where signs are
as expected).
² When confronting QM-AC, quality of management is less important than (is dominted by)
AC for all three types of institutions and less important than MH in the case of FC and
private banks.
² Interestingly, QM is more important than MH in the case of public banks.
For the case of FC the implications is clear, AC dominate as cause of failure, followed by MH,
and QM (as proxied) has no impact on failure .
8 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we study the relationship that exists between ownership and governance structure of
depository institutions (DI) on one side, and the dominant cause of failure on the other. Extant
theory implies that while in stock owned DI, where management is either well controled (through
markets or board control) or interests are aligned with those of shareholders, the dominant cause
of failure will be moral hazard (MH) between shareholders and debtholders, manifested in balance
sheet or o¤-balance sheet risk taking. On the other hand, in DI of di¤use ownership with poor
management control or where management’s interests are not alligned with those of owners, the
dominant cause of failure will be agency costs (AC), manifested in expense preference behavior
that leads to failure. We exploit the opportunity that o¤ers the Colombian crisis of banks and
…nancial cooperatives (FC) and the relatively good quality of data available for this country to
perform the study. Our objective is to establish empirically the relative importance of these two
con‡icts as determinants of insolvency in DI. Results suggest that, in the case of Colombia, moral
hazard is a key factor in explaining bank failure while agency costs explain insolvencies among FC.
In state-owned banks both moral hazard and agency costs are signi…cant in explaining failure.
The results of the analysis presented in this paper suggest that, in the case of Colombia, agency
costs are a key factor explaining failure among FC. Furthermore, this is a result that in contrast
to privately-owned commercial banks, whose main determinant of failures are factors that can be
considered an expression of MH between shareholders and depositors, the classical con‡ict studied
in the banking literature. All statistical tests performed on the data including, Gauss-Newton
arti…cial regressions, used to confornt alternative models, Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Wald test
support unambiguously the hypothesis that in …nancial cooperatives AC variables play a signi…cant
and more important role in explaining failure than MH variables. To note is also the importance
of AC variables in explaining failure of government-owned banks. These appear to behave in a
fashion closer to FC rather than to private banks. Also, when confronting these hypothesis of cause
22of failure against the argument that the causes of failure are due to ”quality of management (QM)”,
we …nd that this is dominated by AC and MH in explaining failure.
This results have signi…cant implications for regulation and supervision (R&S) of FC. In the
case of banks the main con‡icts target of R&S is the moral hazard con‡ict that exists between
shareholders and liability (mainly deposits) holders. Most of the so-called Basle standards of bank
regulation and supervision tend to control precisely this con‡ict, while ignoring totally agency
con‡icts. These, implicitly, are assumed to be easily controllable by shareholders and the market.
This is so for industrialized as well as developing countries. The results suggest that in the case of
FC a focus on the R&S of agency con‡icts is needed. As the arguments forwarded by Jäger [49]
suggest, this is precisely what some of the models of governance, R&S of FC do in some countries,
where federated structures armed with built-in (delegated) monitoring function, are designed to
control agency con‡icts. This is also consistent with the results of Akella and Greenbaum [1] who
conclude that the weakness in the governance of mutual …nancial intermediaries suggests a need of
regulatory and supervisory focus designed to limit the exercise of ”expense preference” behavior.
Lastly, interms of R&S, these results suggest that the increasingly common approach adopted in
Africa, Asia and Latin America to fold FC under the same R&S framework used for (stock owned)
commercial banks is inappropriate and dangerous. Basle standards of R&S simply lack the focus on
the control of agency con‡ictsthat is so essential to prudential supervision of mutual intermediaries.
Thus, while some of the norms destined to control moral hazard (e.g. capital standards and risk-
weighted assets) between share and liability holders of stock banks might be applicable to mutual
intermediaries, there is a clear need for an adapted approach that will control the possibly much
more serious con‡ict of interest between administrators and members of a mutual intermediary.
One more interesting interpretation can be made of these results. In some countries, local
government-owned banks have been structured around federated structures and have been oper-
ating with a considerable success: two examples are the Spanish Cajas and the German Landes-
banken.24 Both these institutions have reached a considerable presence in terms of market share
and stability despite a weakness in the governance structure typical of non-private …nancial inter-
mediaries. This would suggest that in government-owned and other community banks, hierarchical
structures (such as federations with delegated monitoring functions or auditing federations) may
serve to compensate for the absence of market-based control mechanisms that help to limit the
e¤ect of expense-preference behavior.
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NOTE: This table, as well as Tables 1-b and 1-c, presents the characteristics of the distributions of the 
independent variables considered. The first section presents the variables that either cannot be associated 
neither to agency costs nor moral hazard, or that are associated to both conflicts.  The second section 
presents the variables that are more strictly associated to  moral hazard, while the last section presents  the 














deviation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Control variables
Reserves/Assets 1,46% 0,86% 0,01% 0,91% 1,35% 1,89% 4,31%
Disposables/Assets 12,79% 6,50% 1,79% 7,94% 12,03% 16,46% 31,84%
Investments/Assets 26,28% 12,03% 4,98% 19,54% 26,20% 32,30% 63,38%
Log(Assets) 18,76 1,78 14,90 17,52 18,91 19,95 22,32
Change in assets -21,19% 49,36% -100,00% -100,00% 3,23% 9,86% 43,53%
Active assets/Liabilities with a cost 103,84% 81,59% 69,46% 93,72% 99,87% 105,46% 168,36%
ROA 7,50% 254,65% -7,07% 0,08% 0,68% 1,40% 4,82%
ROE 12,80% 333,64% -59,00% 0,51% 5,54% 11,58% 33,20%
Results on paid capital and reserves 5,14% 362,40% -236,25% 1,03% 11,33% 23,73% 174,75%
Cost of external funds 11,19% 10,85% 0,00% 1,64% 11,04% 16,74% 37,27%
Moral hazard variables
Proportion of pass-due credits 2,87% 5,18% 0,00% 0,00% 1,21% 4,08% 25,80%
Change in the proportion of pass-due cred 18,85% 94,34% -85,04% -14,32% 3,14% 25,81% 378,10%
Proportion of unproductive assets 3,57% 21,68% 0,01% 1,54% 2,40% 3,79% 10,85%
Proportion of collateralized credits 37,94% 37,10% 0,00% 0,00% 26,12% 74,39% 99,62%
Coverage of pass-due credits 62,76% 92,69% 0,00% 28,42% 46,83% 70,97% 445,19%
Provisions/Total credits 2,12% 4,16% 0,00% 0,59% 1,27% 2,41% 11,02%
(Capital+Provisions on credits)/Assets 15,69% 25,53% 4,83% 10,09% 12,77% 16,60% 80,50%
Capital exposure 28,12% 219,27% 0,00% 8,86% 21,32% 40,99% 193,80%
(Reserves+paid capital)/Capital 51,43% 326,27% 0,71% 44,90% 58,52% 71,00% 205,57%
Capital/Deposits 28,73% 94,51% 6,54% 14,08% 19,50% 27,95% 160,85%
Financial income/Assets 11,33% 9,18% 0,64% 5,21% 9,28% 16,56% 36,00%
Return on credits 7,14% 8,58% 0,00% 0,55% 2,22% 12,91% 29,96%
Interest rate GAP -59,00% 13,84% -79,35% -67,25% -61,07% -53,25% -3,24%
Agency costs variables
Credits/Assets 53,75% 12,13% 23,18% 45,57% 54,41% 61,52% 82,16%
Deposits/Credits 119,34% 44,66% 38,66% 89,67% 109,52% 142,05% 256,88%
Fixed assets/Assets 2,80% 2,01% 0,37% 1,76% 2,37% 3,21% 9,67%
Non financial costs/Assets 4,10% 3,87% 0,84% 2,17% 3,17% 4,93% 20,45%
Personnel expenses/Assets 2,23% 1,33% 0,00% 1,32% 2,03% 2,87% 5,89%
Operational margin -8,50% 661,32% -45,17% 2,38% 10,62% 18,14% 100,00%
Financial margin/Administrative costs 186,57% 133,50% 37,53% 118,51% 144,89% 234,07% 806,48%
Table 1-a: General statistics. Private Banks




deviation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Control variables
Reserves/Assets 1,69% 0,95% 0,00% 1,10% 1,76% 2,35% 3,91%
Disposables/Assets 14,29% 8,59% 0,69% 7,43% 14,44% 20,50% 34,52%
Investments/Assets 25,42% 10,55% 3,77% 17,14% 26,83% 33,24% 45,94%
Log(Assets) 19,61 1,55 15,50 18,62 20,05 20,69 22,31
Change in assets -22,49% 72,02% -100,00% -100,00% 2,20% 7,67% 30,09%
Active assets/Liabilities with a cost 92,72% 13,61% 52,16% 86,74% 94,52% 100,05% 137,07%
ROA -0,78% 6,63% -28,47% -0,68% 0,20% 1,07% 5,82%
ROE 9,16% 173,49% -324,02% -1,49% 3,71% 14,08% 386,56%
Results on paid capital and reserves -39,62% 595,19% -633,76% -9,77% 4,75% 19,65% 98,85%
Cost of external funds 8,12% 8,05% 0,00% 0,01% 6,96% 12,49% 30,14%
Moral hazard variables
Proportion of pass-due credits 4,14% 6,76% 0,00% 0,00% 2,02% 5,59% 29,18%
Change in the proportion of pass-due cred 115,17% 1219,73% -49,71% -9,50% 3,15% 16,05% 301,79%
Proportion of unproductive assets 4,74% 5,49% 0,31% 2,13% 3,13% 5,83% 24,44%
Proportion of collateralized credits 43,93% 39,26% 0,00% 0,00% 55,93% 83,40% 99,37%
Coverage of pass-due credits 1805,25% 14126,34% 10,61% 43,86% 64,97% 96,90% 73326,04%
Provisions/Total credits 5,31% 7,80% 0,00% 1,45% 2,97% 5,54% 42,00%
(Capital+Provisions on credits)/Assets 13,93% 14,87% -4,72% 8,05% 11,81% 15,54% 79,46%
Capital exposure 21,79% 269,15% -693,86% 12,91% 35,20% 66,16% 281,18%
(Reserves+paid capital)/Capital 34,19% 263,18% -738,18% 36,76% 47,18% 61,56% 723,28%
Capital/Deposits 236,60% 1520,48% -67,16% 9,90% 16,75% 21,03% 6895,73%
Financial income/Assets 8,89% 9,44% 0,21% 2,27% 7,10% 12,54% 41,88%
Return on credits 5,50% 8,07% 0,00% 0,44% 1,37% 7,69% 30,68%
Interest rate GAP -69,07% 55,38% -277,85% -71,09% -62,94% -55,52% -26,22%
Agency costs variables
Credits/Assets 55,78% 32,88% 27,51% 45,72% 51,97% 58,77% 180,94%
Deposits/Credits 125,92% 51,01% 0,19% 104,45% 121,71% 150,21% 270,40%
Fixed assets/Assets 2,48% 1,79% 0,61% 1,43% 2,09% 2,85% 8,65%
Non financial costs/Assets 6,23% 7,21% 1,25% 2,85% 4,31% 6,95% 37,59%
Personnel expenses/Assets 3,36% 2,34% 0,02% 1,89% 2,81% 4,23% 9,66%
Operational margin -10,22% 57,48% -200,67% -11,97% 0,83% 10,01% 53,93%
Financial margin/Administrative costs 147,44% 97,14% -62,65% 99,13% 126,99% 203,06% 339,02%
Table 1-b: General statistics. State Banks










deviation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Control variables
Reserves/Assets 0,99% 0,89% 0,00% 0,38% 0,69% 1,38% 3,76%
Disposables/Assets 4,40% 3,35% 0,67% 1,71% 3,29% 6,54% 13,69%
Investments/Assets 7,62% 6,34% 0,70% 3,28% 5,92% 9,63% 29,27%
Log(Assets) 16,52 1,95 13,84 15,64 16,26 17,54 20,60
Change in assets 18,38% 29,16% -49,26% -0,34% 14,21% 34,21% 100,00%
Active assets/Liabilities with a cost 147,67% 151,24% 39,06% 94,36% 111,51% 138,93% 857,44%
ROA -1,10% 6,50% -17,00% -1,83% -0,29% 0,86% 7,05%
ROE -6,06% 48,95% -111,02% -5,71% -0,82% 3,34% 17,63%
Results on paid capital and reserves -235,22% 888,60% -3539,25% -179,88% -47,09% -6,35% 163,54%
Cost of external funds 16,85% 5,90% 5,49% 12,71% 16,25% 19,68% 34,51%
Moral hazard variables
Proportion of pass-due credits 18,52% 12,67% 2,17% 10,87% 15,25% 22,72% 65,31%
Change in the proportion of pass-due cred 10,66% 42,89% -108,54% -6,00% 5,66% 24,20% 100,00%
Proportion of unproductive assets 7,29% 5,42% 0,05% 3,82% 5,93% 9,98% 24,64%
Proportion of collateralized credits 43,07% 32,60% 5,97% 12,29% 37,68% 62,40% 100,00%
Coverage of pass-due credits 24,53% 15,45% 0,97% 13,67% 22,06% 34,00% 58,61%
Provisions/Total credits 3,98% 4,81% 0,12% 1,33% 2,58% 4,92% 16,81%
(Capital+Provisions on credits)/Assets 35,65% 17,60% 7,52% 23,49% 31,32% 44,18% 82,09%
Capital exposure 49,09% 79,02% -13,16% 17,25% 36,95% 56,34% 419,26%
(Reserves+paid capital)/Capital 5,80% 9,18% 0,00% 0,00% 2,29% 8,78% 35,76%
Capital/Deposits 455,25% 2443,11% -3,90% 32,89% 61,71% 140,65% 9528,20%
Financial income/Assets 18,17% 6,43% 8,64% 13,46% 17,08% 21,38% 36,34%
Return on credits 24,28% 7,56% 9,05% 18,99% 23,75% 28,51% 43,05%
Interest rate GAP -39,89% 23,77% -76,43% -57,03% -43,56% -25,55% 26,23%
Agency costs variables
Credits/Assets 61,43% 13,30% 20,08% 54,66% 63,47% 70,19% 88,11%
Deposits/Credits 77,97% 43,71% 0,63% 49,86% 79,64% 99,30% 209,77%
Fixed assets/Assets 10,14% 6,17% 0,65% 5,55% 9,21% 13,50% 30,57%
Non financial costs/Assets 5,93% 4,96% 1,29% 3,68% 5,00% 7,03% 21,13%
Personnel expenses/Assets 4,11% 1,82% 1,18% 2,93% 3,85% 4,94% 10,70%
Operational margin 2,08% 28,03% -99,11% -4,78% 1,43% 13,64% 85,81%







NOTE: The objective of this table is to compare the distribution of some ratios for failed and healthy institutions, to facilitate 
the analysis that will be done in the subsequent analyses.  The first two columns present the  means of both samples, while 
the third and fourth columns compare the standard deviations.  Finally, the fifth column presents the level of significance of 
a difference of means test.  The lower the level of significance, the greater the probability that both distributions are 
statistically different.   Tables 2-b and 2-c present similar results. 
Table 2-a: Statistics for failed and healthy samples. Private Banks
Mean Standard error
 Significance of 
difference of 
means
Variable Failed Healthy Failed Healthy    Significance  (%)
Control variables
Reserves /Assets 1,55% 1,46% 0,01% 0,01%       NA
Disposables/Assets 10,11% 12,86% 0,34% 0,42% 0,00%
Log(Assets) 1830,44% 1876,75% 314,20% 315,73% 0,76%
Change in assets  -41,01% -20,61% 25,69% 24,23% 0,00%
Active assets/Liabilities with a cost  90,33% 104,18% 2,52% 68,13% 0,00%
ROA 276,05% 0,57% 25822,47% 0,03% 36,24%
ROE 351,81% 4,06% 44252,61% 4,29% 39,77%
Results on paid capital and reserves  -119,62% 8,35% 36098,11% 439,96% 45,40%
Cost of external funds  13,80% 11,13% 1,46% 1,17% 0,00%
Moral hazard variables
Proportion of pass-due credits  7,33% 2,76% 3,05% 0,19% 0,00%
Change in the proportion of pass-due credits  4,81% 19,24% 32,98% 90,53% 0,71%
Proportion of unproductive assets  29,81% 2,89% 183,71% 0,04% 0,00%
Proportion of collateralized credits  35,93% 37,99% 9,22% 13,89% 0,16%
Coverage of pass-due credits  151,34% 60,41% 1111,67% 57,83% 4,36%
Provisions/Total credits  13,65% 1,82% 4,13% 0,04% 0,00%
(Capital+Provisions on credits)/Assets  48,59% 14,84% 222,22% 0,84% 0,00%
Capital exposure  88,32% 26,57% 366,94% 483,04% 0,83%
(Reserves+paid capital)/Capital  105,97% 50,02% 317,19% 1083,26% 9,37%
Capital/Deposits 31,38% 28,67% 28,53% 90,87% 23,33%
Financial income/Assets  13,43% 11,27% 1,47% 0,83% 0,00%
Return on credits  10,27% 7,06% 1,40% 0,72% 0,00%
Interest rate GAP  -60,02% -58,98% 4,03% 1,86% 0,00%
Agency costs variables
Credits/Assets 48,82% 53,88% 2,89% 1,43% 0,00%
Deposits/Credits 125,53% 119,18% 19,32% 19,97% 0,00%
Fixed assets/Assets  3,04% 2,80% 0,10% 0,04% 0,00%
Non financial costs/Assets  10,85% 3,92% 1,89% 0,09% 0,00%
Personnel expenses/Assets  3,32% 2,20% 0,13% 0,01%       NA
Operational margin  -751,17% 10,67% 173197,33% 3,59% 44,23%





Table 2-b: Statistics for failed and healthy samples. State Banks Ta
Mean Standard error
 Significance of 
difference of 
means
Variable Failed Healthy  Failed  Healthy   Significance (%)
Control variables
Reserves /Assets 1,86% 1,64% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00%
Disposables/Assets 16,49% 13,66% 0,44% 0,81% 0,00%
Log(Assets) 1906,69% 1976,34% 351,99% 199,42% 0,00%
Change in assets  -38,00% -18,13% 31,19% 56,94% 0,00%
Active assets/Liabilities with a cost  82,95% 95,45% 1,80% 1,53%       NA
ROA  -4,31% 0,22% 1,58% 0,07%       NA
ROE -9,38% 14,39% 104,79% 355,67% 0,00%
Results on paid capital and reserves  -182,14% 0,60% 15749,25% 66,63% 17,47%
Cost of external funds  9,76% 7,66% 0,93% 0,56% 0,00%
Moral hazard variables
Proportion of pass-due credits  5,55% 3,74% 1,02% 0,30% 0,00%
Change in the proportion of pass-due credits  6,79% 136,35% 6,73% 17772,33% 40,22%
Proportion of unproductive assets  6,94% 4,11% 0,74% 0,16%       NA
Proportion of collateralized credits  42,35% 44,38% 11,90% 16,43% 0,00%
Coverage of pass-due credits  69,98% 2169,56% 9,83% 2409121,69% 48,68%
Provisions/Total credits  12,78% 3,22% 1,82% 0,08%       NA
(Capital+Provisions on credits)/Assets  21,67% 11,74% 6,84% 0,70% 0,00%
Capital exposure  41,18% 16,32% 90,35% 902,91% 2,13%
(Reserves+paid capital)/Capital  68,39% 24,53% 208,14% 826,31% 0,03%
Capital/Deposits 7,75% 300,40% 87,16% 29373,93% 21,34%
Financial income/Assets  7,91% 9,17% 0,36% 1,04% 0,00%
Return on credits  3,83% 5,97% 0,36% 0,72% 0,00%
Interest rate GAP  -66,75% -69,73% 6,63% 37,51% 0,00%
Agency costs variables
Credits/Assets 43,52% 59,26% 1,29% 12,98% 0,00%
Deposits/Credits 161,06% 116,12% 33,92% 19,52% 0,00%
Fixed assets/Assets  2,16% 2,57% 0,07% 0,02%       NA
Non financial costs/Assets  8,46% 5,60% 1,51% 0,22% 0,00%
Personnel expenses/Assets  2,96% 3,48% 0,03% 0,06% 0,00%
Operational margin  -35,32% -3,14% 112,70% 8,58% 0,00%





Table 2-c: Statistics for failed and healthy samples. Financial Cooperatives
Mean Standard error
 Significance of 
difference of 
means
Variable Failed Healthy Failed  Healthy    Significance  (%)
Control variables
Reserves /Assets 0,96% 1,13% 0,01% 0,40% 0,10%
Disposables/Assets 4,59% 1,83% 0,14% 0,10% 0,00%
Log(Assets) 1825,74% 1647,65% 56,59% 379,02% 0,00%
Change in assets  -27,45% 19,80% 19,90% 7,54% 0,00%
Active assets/Liabilities with a cost  82,14% 154,87% 3,70% 222,25% 0,50%
ROA -17,42% -0,20% 8,67% 0,11% 0,00%
ROE 7,99% -4,50% 70,90% 19,56% 8,37%
Results on paid capital and reserves  -1237,55% -175,90% 98762,39% 3853,72% 46,70%
Cost of external funds  18,80% 7,81% 1,75% 0,84% 0,00%
Moral hazard variables
Proportion of pass-due credits  22,65% 7,50% 1,77% 1,46% 0,00%
Change in the proportion of pass-due credits  10,21% 16,30% 8,02% 22,02% 5,24%
Proportion of unproductive assets  14,05% 3,49% 1,88% 0,56% 0,00%
Proportion of collateralized credits  41,84% 17,50% 4,30% 8,87% 0,00%
Coverage of pass-due credits  42,98% 22,88% 7,50% 2,42% 0,00%
Provisions/Total credits  12,43% 1,45% 2,50% 0,08% 0,00%
(Capital+Provisions on credits)/Assets  19,45% 34,09% 1,21% 3,45% 0,00%
Capital exposure  43,12% 20,58% 62,09% 31,67% 2,72%
(Reserves+paid capital)/Capital  16,52% 4,32% 2,24% 0,66% 0,00%
Capital/Deposits 8,26% 426,48% 13,65% 50899,01% 46,73%
Financial income/Assets  21,54% 7,22% 2,21% 0,92% 0,00%
Return on credits  27,68% 9,76% 1,04% 1,62% 0,00%
Interest rate GAP  -64,35% -15,94% 1,71% 6,13% 0,00%
Agency costs variables
Credits/Assets 50,78% 61,95% 1,93% 2,32% 0,00%
Deposits/Credits 162,73% 69,34% 82,85% 16,79% 0,00%
Fixed assets/Assets  15,79% 8,43% 0,47% 0,42% 0,00%
Non financial costs/Assets  16,17% 4,73% 5,71% 0,13% 0,00%
Personnel expenses/Assets  4,40% 3,39% 0,04% 0,05% 0,00%
Operational margin  -31,87% 4,93% 26,09% 6,24% 0,00%













Table 3: Sign of coefficients – All 
          
 Logit  regression       
Variable  Expected sign    First interpretation  Second interpretation  Comment on results 
Control variables 
ROA  -/+  
Agency cost hypothesis: 
Lower ROA are associated to 
EPB 
Moral hazard hypothesis: 
Higher ROA are associated 
with moral hazard. 
The agency cost argument 
dominates the moral hazard 
argument in FC. The coefficient is 
negative for stock banks also. 
Moral hazard variables 
Proportion of 
unproductive assets  Positive  
More unproductive credit 
suggest a high risk high moral 
hazard strategy 
  The coefficient is positive for all 
DI except FC. 
Capital/Assets  Negative   Lesser leverage reduces the 
risk of failure    The coefficient is negative for all 
DI (significant for stock banks). 





Measure of the sufficiency of 
the financial margin to cover at 
least the administrative costs. 
As these get greater, the 
probability of failure increases 
too. 
  The coefficient is negative for FC 
and for stock banks. 
Deposits/Credits  Positive  
Agency cost hypothesis: 
Measure of the use of the 
financial resources. A ratio 
above 100% means the 
institution is using resources 
for purposes other than 
intermediation cycle through 
allocation of credits 
Moral hazard hypothesis: 
A ratio that falls very low 
might be considered as an 
indicator of high credit risk 
and thus a higher risk of 
failure. 
Positive for all DI. The agency cost 
interpretation dominates the 
credit risk (Moral hazard) 
hypothesis. 
NOTE:  This table present the expected signs of all the variables that were included into our final model.  A positive 
relationship means that the higher the ratio, the greater is the probability of failure.  For example, consider the proportion of 
unproductive assets:  The greater that proportion, the greater is the probability of failure.  We also included one or two 
interpretations for each relationship.  The first interpretations is always explaining the expected sign, while the second 
interpretation is giving an alternative interpretation for a relationship  contrary to the expected sign.   We then present some 
comments on the observed results,  compared to the expected relationship.  39  
 
 
Table 4-a: Events of failure – Financial Cooperatives 
  Crisis of 1998  
Name of cooperative 
(1) 
Initial date of 
difficulties  Description 
Financial Cooperatives (FC) 
ANCHICAYA  1998-05  Intervened to liquidate by Dancoop (Res. 0948) on May 26 of 1998.1 
ARKAS 1999-07 
Intervened to liquidate by the Superintendence of Banks (Res 1009) on July 1st of
1999. 
AVANCEMOS 1997-03 
Intervened to administrate by Dancoop (Res. 361) in March of 1997 and to liquidate
(Res. 1776) on November 4 of 1997. 
CAJA .POPULAR  1997-11  Intervened to administrate by Dancoop (Res. 1889) on November 19 of 1997. 
COACREDITO 1998-04 
Intervened to administrate by Dancoop (Res. 0663) on April 29 of 1998 and to
liquidate (Res. 1368) o n August 14 of 1998.  
COFIANDINA 1998-07 
Intervened to liquidate by the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 0892) on July 15 of
1998. 
COFICREDITO  1998-12  Voluntary liquidation in December 1998. 
COFIROYAL  1997-12  Intervened to liquidate by Dancoop (Res. 2273) on December 31 of 1997. 
CONALCREDITO  1999-05  Intervened to liquidate by Dancoop (Res. 0592) on May 12 of 1999. 
CONSTRUYECOOP 1998-07 
Intervened to liquidate by the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 2430) on December 11
of 1998, but a special supervision began on July 15 of the same year.  
COOEMSAVAL 1998-09 
Intervention to administrate (Res. 1198) on September 11 of 1998 and to liquidate by
the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 2150) on October 6 of the same year. 
COOFINDES 1999-06 
Intervened to liquidate by the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 0962) on June 23 of
1999. 
COOPERADORES  1998-08  Intervened to liquidate by Dancoop (Res. 1239) on August 3 of 1998. 
COOPFERIAS 1998-09 
Intervened to administrate (Res. 2000) on September 11 of 1998 and to liquidate by
the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 2151) on October 6 of 1998.  
COOPIANTIOQUIA   1998-10 
Intervened to liquidate by the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 2149) on October 6 of
1998. 
COOPSIBATE 1998-12 
Merged with Cupocredito and Bancoop, creating a a limited liability society: 
Megabanco. 
COOSERVIR  1997-12  Intervened to liquidate by Dancoop (Res. 1775) on December 30 of 1997. 
COOTRABACO 1998-03 
Intervened to administrate (Res. 0401) on March 5 of 1998 and then to liquidate by
Dancoop (Res. 1056) on July 14 of 1998.  
CREDIFENALCO  1998-02  Intervened to Administrate by Dancoop (Res. 0377) on February 27 of 1998. 
CREDISOCIAL 1 998-07  
Intervened to liquidate by the Superintendence of Banks (Res. 0977) on July 29 of
1998. 
CUPOCREDITO  1998-12  Merged with Coopsibate and Bancoop, creating a limited liability society: Megabanco 
FINANCOOP 1998-08 
Intervened to administrate (Res. 1101) on August 21 of 1998 and then to liquidate by
the  Superintendence of Banks (Res. 1199) on September 11 of 1998.  
JOREPLAT 1997-12 
Intervened to administrate (Res. 2006) on December 3 of 1997 and then to liquidate
by Dancoop (Res 0180) on January 29 of 1998.  
SOLIDARIOS 1998-08 
Intervened to administrate (Res. 1100) on August 21 of 1998 and then to liquidate by




Shareholders contribution of 184.000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately
US$ 85 millions), credit of Fogafin for 286.000 millions of Colombian pesos 
(approximately US$ 132 millions) and State co ntributio n thro ugh a s pecial tax (1) fo r
661.000 millions of Colombian pesos in November and December of 1999. 





Seizure of assets and liabilities to Banco U.C.N. S.A in July 1998. Nationalized in
October 1998. Took ov er by  the Banco del Estado in August 1999 under Decree 1167
of 1999. 
BANCOOP 1998-12 
Cession of assets and liabilities to Coopdesarrollo in Nov ember 1998. Voluntary
liquidation on February 26 of 1999. 
(1) We only present the failures events. The complete listing of financial cooperatives can be made available by the authors. 
                                                  
1 Dancoop is the body responsible for the supervision of cooperatives (smaller financial and non-financial).  
NOTE:  This table reviews all the events of failure observed in the last five years for the principal 
Colombian cooperatives. 40  
Table 4-b: Events of failure – Private and State Banks 
  Crisis of 1985 
Crisis of
1998  







date   Descripción 
BANCO DE BOGOTA       
Acquisition of Banco del Comercio in December 1991.  Approbation of the 
Superintendencia Bancaria under Resolution 4949 of December 2 of 1992. 
BANCO POPULAR S.A.        Privatized on November 1996. The government sells to OLCSA. 
BANCO DE COLOMBIA  1985-12  1993-12  1998-06 
Nationalized on January of 1986 an then privatized on December of 1993. Mergered
with BIC in April of 1998 .  
BANCO DE COMERCIO  1987-06      Nationalized in August 1987 and then sold to Banco Bogotá on December 18  of 19 9 1.  
BANCAFE     1999-09 
Capitalization of 600. 000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$ 275 
millions) in September and October of 1999. 
BANCO SANTANDER –  
BANCOQUIA        The Banco Santander buys 55% of the shares of Bancoquia in June 1997. 
BANCOLOMBIA S.A. – 
BIC      
Datas of BIC until June 1998 and then of the merger of BIC - BANCOLOMBIA 
thereafter. Merger authorized on April 2 of 1998. 
ABN AMRO BANK 
COLOMBIA S.A. - REAL      1999-06 
BANCO REAL absorbed by ABN AMRO, forming ABN AMRO BANK COLOMBIA S . A.
in June 1999. 
BANCO AGRARIO 
(CAJA AGRARIA)     1999-06 
Capitalization of 150. 000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$ 70 
millions) in June 1999. Liquidation authorized in June 1999 with Decree 1065 of 1999
and liquidation under Resolution 1726 of November 19 of 1999. 
BBV BANCO 
GANADERO S.A.      
Considered as a private bank from June 1989, for the inflexion in the tend ency of the
rentability.  Acquisition of 40% of shares by Bilbao Viscaya España in June 1996 .  
BANCO DE CREDITO      1999-12 
Shareholders contribution of 15.000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$ 
7 millions) and special credit of the Deposits Insurance Fund (Fogafin) of 60.000
mi l l i ons of  Col omb i an p esos (ap p r ox i mat el y  U S$ 28 mi l l i on s) i n Dec ember of 1999. 
BANCO NACIONAL   1982-06      L iquidated in June 1982. 
BANCO ANDINO      1999-06  Liquidated on May 20, 1999 under Resolution 0750. 
BANCO SANTANDER       1992-03  Bought by Bancoquia in March 1992, forming the new Banco Santander. 
BANCO NACIONAL 
DEL COMERCIO, BNC      1997-06 
Credit-line for capitalization offered by Banco Ganadero Panamá. Merger with Banco 
Ganadero in October 1998.  
RED MULTIBANCA 
COLPATRIA S.A.     1999-09 
In August 1996 acquired the financial corporation CORPAVI.  Shareholders 
contribution to capital of 58.000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$ 25
millions) and credit of Fogafin for 212.000 millions of Colombian pesos 
(approximately US$ 100 millions) in August 1999. Change of social reason in October
1998:  The new institution becomes RED MULTIBANCA COLPATRIA. 
BANCO DEL ESTADO  1982-06  1988-12  1996-12 
Nationalized in October 1982 after evident problems began in June of the s ame year. 
The bank was back to life in December 1988 as its capital got positive again. Received
guarantee capital in November 1996 and again in 1999. 
BANCO UNION 
COLOMBIANO     1999-09 
Mergered with the financial corporation Unión in December 1996.  Sharehold ers
contribution of 5.000 millions of Colombian pesos (a little more than US$ 2 millions)
and a credit of Fogafin of 28.000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$ 13




(EXTEBANDES)      
Changed its social reason from EXTEBANDES to STANDARD CHARTERED 
COLOMBIA in February  1998. 
BANCO CENTRAL 
HIPOTECARIO     1999-09 
Capitalization of 550. 000  millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$ 250
millions) in July and September of 1999. 
MERCANTIL DE 
COLOMBIA 
S.A.(TRABAJADORES) 1985-12 1991-12   
Nationalized in April 1986 after evident problems since December 198 5.  Sold  to Banco
Mercantil de Venezuela on August 27 , 1991. 
BANCO TEQUENDAMA 
S.A.  1985-12 1991-12   
Nationalized in March 1986, though problems were evident since December 1985. Sold
to Banco Construcción on October 17 of 1991 and then to Credicorp of Perú in 
December of 1996. 
BANCO PACIFICO      1999-06  Liquidated on May  20 of 1999 with Resolution 0751. 
BANCO SUPERIOR      1999-09 
Shareholders contribution of 17.000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$
8 millions) and credit of Fogafin for 52.000 millions of Colombian pesos in August
1999. Additional shareholders contribution of 48.000 millions of Colombian pesos
(approximately US$ 23 millions)  in April 2000.  
INTERCONTINENTAL     1999-12 
Shareholders capitalization of 15.000 millions of Colombian pesos (approximately US$
7 millions) and credit of Fogafin for 43.000 millions of Colombian pesos 
(approximately US$ 20 millions) in October 1999. 
BANCO SELFIN      1999-09  Intervention to liquidate on July 16 of 1999, under Resolution 1100. 
DAVIVIENDA S.A.       
Conversion to commercial bank in March 1998 (Davivienda originally was specializing
in the mortgage sector). 
ABN AMRO BANK          Authorization to enter the Colombian market in December 1997. 
(1) We only present the failures events. The complete listing of banks can be made available by the authors. 
(2) “El 2 por mil” is a temporary tax of 0,2% that is charged on the complete amount of all financial transactions on current and deposit accounts. The 
tax is intended to provide Fogafin the sufficient liquidities to capitalize financial institutions in distress in the current financial crisis context. 
NOTE:  This table reviews all the events of failure of commercial banks observed in the last twenty years. 41  
 
 
















Log(Assets)   76,57%             
Return on assets   33,07%  28,19%           
Proportion of unproductive assets   41,51%  71,21%  0,49%         
Capital / Assets   55,95%  77,07%  21,28%  51,15%       
Depositos/Credits   89,06%  83,90%  25,30%  52,79%  62,56%     
Suficiency of margin  61,69%  72,07%  43,53%  33,52%  60,98%  61,76%   
R-square auxiliary regression  90,39%  96,05%  29,12%  80,48%  80,35%  93,43%  73,05% 
R-square auxiliary regression (1)  90,13%    28,65%  63,30%  73,91%  92,44%  66,60% 
R-square auxiliary regression (2)      25,72%  62,90%  73,90%  76,63%  72,98% 
(1)  Once Log(Assets) was eliminated from the model.           
(2)  Once Log(Assets) and Disposables /Assets were eliminated from the model.       
NOTE:  This table presents in the first part the matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients.  The second part 
present the R-Squared of the regression of the variables presented in the first row as dependent variables against 
the remaining variables. Due to multicollinearity, we decided to eliminate two ratios: Disposables/Assets and 
Log(Assets).  We also estimated the model without eliminating these two variables, treating the multicollinearity 
problem with orthogonolization.  The same process was done for state banks and FC in Tables 5-b and 5-C 
respectively. 
 
















Log(Assets)   88,76%             
Return on assets   -0,43%  -5,03%           
Proportion of unproductive assets   65,06%  77,34%  -29,83%         
Capital / Assets   73,96%  78,37%  -3,60%  57,63%       
Depositos/Credits   89,61%  93,86%  -2,12%  71,05%  79,20%     
Suficiency of margin  77,90%  88,74%  16,34%  57,05%  65,48%  83,23%   
R-square auxiliary regression  79,04%  93,81%  27,11%  70,21%  59,65%  88,57%  77,64% 
R-square auxiliary regression (1)  76,89%    25,60%  57,64%  57,65%  86,27%  64,29% 
R-square auxiliary regression (2)      24,82%  57,46%  57,18%  79,63%  64,12% 
(1)  Once Log(Assets) was eliminated from the model.           
(2)  Once Log(Assets) and Disposables /Assets were eliminated from the model.       
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Log(Assets)   22,31%             
Return on assets   -39,06%  -10,02%           
Proportion of unproductive assets   74,52%  17,02%  -54,80%         
Capital / Assets   23,24%  79,94%  -4,40%  16,03%       
Depositos/Credits   27,63%  83,91%  -19,14%  25,13%  51,76%     
Suficiency of margin  -10,94%  49,83%  27,15%  -12,94%  44,78%  38,04%   
R-square auxiliary regression  64,10%  96,85%  41,21%  74,48%  89,66%  90,87%  65,28% 
R-square auxiliary regression (1)  64,10%    41,15%  73,87%  60,36%  66,04%  61,25% 
R-square auxiliary regression (2)      40,92%  63,42%  89,54%  90,81%  64,20% 
(1)  Once Log(Assets) was eliminated from the model.           
(2)  Once Log(Assets) and Disposables /Assets were eliminated from the model.       43  
 
Table 6: Tests of Logit Models – All 
 
Financial 
Cooperatives  Public Banks  Private Banks 
Moral Hazard Model          
Constant -3,331  -2,857  -1,834 
 (-3,304)  (-7,260)  (-2,256) 
ROA   2,088  2,204  -40,293 
 (0,184)  (0,228)  (-2,570) 
Proportion of unproductive assets   25,840  23,105  19,002 
 (2,468)  (3,819)  (1,802) 
Capital/Assets -8,003  4,441  -30,669 
 (-1,951)  (1,855)  (-4,327) 
Proportion of cases corect  97,59%  82,85%  98,86% 
LogLikelihood -25,417  -140,652  -58,470 
      
Cost of agency model          
Constant -7,621  -7,602  -3,241 
 (-3,093)  (-6,965)  (-4,348) 
ROA   -5,386  -47,826  -32,398 
 (-0,410)  (-4,067)  (-2,752) 
Deposits/Credits   5,131  3,201  -0,045 
 (2,663)  (5,531)  (-0,100) 
Financial margin / Operational costs  -0,986  1,230  -0,451 
 (-1,173)  (4,591)  (-1,593) 
Proportion of cases corect  97,57%  82,57%  98,43% 
LogLikelihood -19,953  -126,975  -89,051 
      
Both effects          
Constant -7,283  -19,449  1,275 
 (-1,375)  (-6,993)  (0,754) 
ROA   -7,543  -31,284  -31,940 
 (-0,342)  (-1,771)  (-1,872) 
Proportion of unproductive assets   -65,655  101,613  9,855 
 (-1,920)  (6,552)  (0,857) 
Capital/Assets -11,631  -5,393  -35,628 
 (-1,490)  (-1,095)  (-4,712) 
Deposits/Credits   13,901  6,703  -1,074 
 (2,570)  (5,978)  (-1,574) 
Financial margin / Operational costs  -3,808  3,293  -0,685 
 (-2,389)  (6,237)  (-1,736) 
Proportion of cases corect  97,39%  88,81%  98,82% 
LogLikelihood -13,193  -76,774  -55,918 
NOTE : This part of Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics (in parentheses), for three 
models : The first one considering moral hazard varables only, the second one considering agency costs variables 
only, and the third one  considering both moral hazard and agency costs variables. 44  
 
Table 6: Tests of Logit Models – All  (Continued) 
Wald Test Statistics (and their significance level) 
Financial 
Cooperatives Public Banks Private Banks 
Hypothesis:  MH coeficients = 0  4,066  53,174  22,362 
 (13,10%)  (0,00%)  (0,00%) 
Hypothesis:  CA coeficients = 0  8,239  55,817  5,605 
   (1,63%)  (0,00%)  (6,07%) 
Maximum Likelihood Test Statistics (and their significance level)       
Hypothesis:  MH coeficients = 0  13,519  100,402  66,265 
 (0,12%)  (0,00%)  (0,00%) 
Hypothesis:  CA coeficients = 0  24,447  127,757  5,104 
   (0,00%)  (0,00%)  (7,79%) 
Akaike information criterion          
Hypothesis:  MH coeficients = 0  1,190  -0,296  0,466 
Hypothesis:  CA coeficients = 0  1,400  -0,207  0,101 
Hypothesis: Both are included  3,759  2,230  2,505 
Consistent Akaike information criterion          
Hypothesis:  MH coeficients = 0  11,274  9,664  12,816 
Hypothesis:  CA coeficients = 0  11,469  9,724  12,432 
Hypothesis: Both are included  18,682  16,884  20,941 
P-test for cost of agency          
Constant 0,943  0,777  0,950 
 (40,236)  (13,191)  (72,622) 
ROA   0,724  -2,078  1,400 
 (2,302)  (-1,183)  (3,404) 
Proportion of unproductive assets   -0,487  -3,625  -0,650 
 (-2,657)  (-3,560)  (-1,862) 
Capital/Assets 0,137  0,841  0,301 
 (2,771)  (1,350)  (2,419) 
Residual impact of cost of agency  -1,109  -0,371  -0,251 
 (-2,502)  -(3,417)  (-0,731) 
R-squared 98,58%  92,09%  99,02% 
P-test for moral hazard          
Constant 1,030  1,261  0,955 
 (62,220)  (8,685)  (61,139) 
ROA   0,757  4,093  1,750 
 (2,899)  (3,320)  (3,576) 
Deposits/Credits   -0,096  -0,264  0,002 
 (-5,233)  (-3,569)  (0,307) 
Financial margin / Operational costs  0,004  -0,131  0,005 
 (1,715)  (-3,261)  (1,316) 
Residual impact of moral hazard  0,303  -0,332  -0,524 
 (1,877)  (-2,255)  (-1,775) 
R-squared 98,64%  93,03%  98,99% 
NOTE:  This section presents the results of the various tests that were completed.  The fourth and fifth sections 
present the Wald and ML statistics and their level of significance (in parentheses).  The sixth and seventh sections 
present the Akaike and CAIC statistics, and the last two sections present the results of the P-tests, with the level of 
significance in parentheses. 